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BEHAVIORAL GENETICS & CRIMINAL
CULPABILITY: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF
FREE WILL IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE MODERN AMERICAN JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Tufik Y. Shayeb*
[M]ore important than the insensitivity of certain criminal offenders to
changes in risks and benefits is the impropriety of casting the crime
problemwholly in terms of a utilitarian calculus. The most serious offenses
are crimes not simply because society finds them inconvenient, but because
it regards themwith moral horror. To steal, to rape, to rob, to assault-4hese
acts are destructive of the very possibility of society and affronts to the
humanity of their victims.1
INTRODUCTION

A little over twenty years ago, the National Institutes of Health
withdrew funding from, and thus effectively shut down, the conference
on "Genetic Factors in Crime: Findings, Uses and Implications." 2

* L.L.M. Biotechnology and Genomics, May 2015, Arizona State
University; J.D., May 2012, magna cum laude, Arizona Summit Law School (f.k.a.
PhoenixSchoolofLaw); B.A. in philosophy, May 2008, Arizona State University,
magna cum laude. Associate Attorney with Ewing and Ewing Attorneys, P.C.
Formerly Executive EditorofAccord,Phoenix Law Review Online, and Staff Editor
of Phoenix Law Review.
' James Q. Wilson, Lock Em' Up and Other Thoughts on Crime, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 9, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/09/archives/lock-em-upand-other-thoughts-on-crime-lock-em-up.html.
2 Patricia

Cohen, Genetic Basisfor Crime:A New Look, N.Y. TIMES (Jun.

19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/arts/genetics-and-crime-at-instituteof-justice-conference.html; see Daniel Goleman, New Storm Brews on Whether
1992),
TIMEs
(Sep.
15,
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Genes, N.Y.
Crime Has Roots
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While a conference organizer assured that "[n]o one would have
claimed there are anything like crime genes," 3 critics charged that the
conference advanced a federal agenda to "find biological correlates of
violence in males, detecting them early in life, and seeking to prevent
their expression." 4 This perceived agenda, which evoked the specters
of eugenics, racism, and genetic determinism, has led some
commentators to rail against the use of genetics to parse the tangle of
causative factors underlying human behavior. 5 As a result, researchers,
apprehensive of leaning on biological explanations that echo dark
points in the history of the science of genetics, have spent decades
approaching the question of criminal behavior causation by
concentrating on social factors. 6
However, "[n]ow that the human genome has been sequenced, and
scientists are studying the genetics of areas as varied as alcoholism and
party affiliation, criminologists are cautiously returning to the
subject." 7 As contemporary genetics research begins to unravel the
mysteries of causation in criminal behavior, the American legal system
again finds itself struggling with an important philosophical dilemma. 8
While American law has traditionally interposed punishment in light
of criminal culpability, advancements in behavioral genetics expose a
potential flaw in this justification: If human behavior is determined by
a multitude of factors, either genetic or environmental in origin, then
free will is little more than a fiction and our reliance on retributivism
as a traditional basis for punishment is not justified. 9 Philosophers

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/15/science/new-storm-brews-on-whether-crimehas-roots-in-genes html.
3 See Goleman, supra note 2 (quoting David Wasserman, Esq., of the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy and organizer of the planned 1992
conference on "Genetic Factors in Crime: Findings, Uses and Implications").
See id. (citing Dr. Peter Breggin, who cited Dr. Frederick Goodwin).
* See id.
6 See Cohen, supra note 2.
7

Id.

See generally Karen Rothenberg & Alice Wang, The Scarlet Gene:
Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Ethnic and Racial Stigma, 69 LAw
CONTEMP. PROBS. 343, 355-59 (2006) (explaining how the "blame-shifting
mechanisms ofgenetic reductionismand genetic determinism" affect the individual,
family, community, and society when genetics research focuses on criminal and
antisocial behavior).
9 See John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of
Responsibility in the Law: A PhilosophicalAnalysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2045-74
&

8
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have struggled with the problem of free will for thousands of years and
now more than ever, as genomic research brings us face to face with
the underpinnings of human nature, we must decide whether free will
is a metaphysical issue best left outside of the courtroom or whether
free will shall serve as the touchstone for evaluating criminal
culpability.' 0
This writing explores the philosophical and legal question of free
will through the lens of behavioral genetics, concluding that moral
culpability should be assessed not by a strict view of free will or hard
determinism, but as a continuum of causal connections evaluated in
terms of public policy. Part I of this writing reviews commonly
accepted theories of criminal punishment, and then goes on to
summarize the philosophical controversy of free will versus
determinism. Part II surveys the contemporary clash of behavioral
genetics and the criminal legal system, by considering issues like the
role of behavioral genetics in criminal adjudication and sentencing.
Part III discusses the problem of free will, as it specifically pertains to
the use of genotyping in criminal proceedings, with a minor detour
into some residual issues surrounding the use of behavioral genetics in
criminal matters. Part IV explores some of the various possible
solutions for coping with the problem of free will, as it arises in the
context of genotyping defenses."
This writing concludes that any solution aimed at solving the
problem of free will in the legal system, as it pertains to behavioral
genetics, must also account for the problem as it exists for other
behavioral sciences and disciplines.1 2 The most likely solution is a
shift from a "mixed" or "balanced" justification of criminal
punishment to a predominately utilitarian justification.1 3 Moreover,
this writing concludes that courts and lawmakers should not tread upon
(1988) (concluding that criminal responsibility is not compatible with a deterministic
outlook of human behavior).
0 Compare Stephen J.Morse, The Non -ProblemofFree Will in Forensic
PsychiatryandPsychology,25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 203 (2007) [hereinafter Morse, The
Non-Problem](arguing that free will is not a problem implicated by some behavioral
sciences) with Phillip Cary,A BriefHistoryofthe ConceptofFree Will: Issues That
Are Not Germane to Legal Reasoning, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 165 (2007)
(distinguishing those issues in the problem of free will that are relevant to
jurisprudence fromthose issues that are not).
" See Conclusion, infra.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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inquiries involving genetic determinism and free will, but should
instead accept that "free will" is a term-of-art consistent with a
compatibilist approach to the free will inquiry.1 4 By embracing a legal
view of causation and human behavior, rather than wrestling with the
metaphysical problem of nature versus nurture, courts and legislatures
might be better equipped to handle the important evidentiary, policy,
and law-making questions that arise from the new findings of
behavioral genetics.
I. THEORIES OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT & THE
PROBLEM OF FREE WILL

With limited exception, it is a fundamental tenet of criminal
jurisprudence that each criminal act contains an actus reus component,
which is the wrongful act or omission of the offender,15 and a mens
rea component, which reflects that offender's culpable state of mind.16
This distinction is an important starting point because mens rea
inquiries are easily conflated with free will inquires.1 7 Yet, mens rea
requirements in criminal statutes often fall into one of four commonly
accepted categories, including purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. 1 8 When examined closely, it becomes apparent that free
will is not necessarily impliated by the latter three categories, which
do not involve the subjective desires or volitional acts of the criminal
offender.1 9 The first category does evoke traditional, commonsense
notions of free will, but does not entirely rest upon the idea. 20
Under the Model Penal Code, an individual acts "purposefully"
when "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or
to cause such a result" or "he is aware of the existence of such

14 id.

" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (2013) ("A person is not guilty of an
offense unless his liability is basedon conduct that includes a voluntary act or the

omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable."); see also D.
O'Connor, The Voluntary Act, 15 MED., SCI. & L. 31 (1975).
16 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2013) (describing the four culpable
states of mind that are commonly recognized under criminal law statutes in the
United States, and which is oftenreferred to as the mens rea component of crimes).
17 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

4

circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist." 21 In contrast,
the free will inquiry explores whether those desires are in fact the
desires of the individual, as opposed to the product of undue external,
biological, or psychological forces acting upon the individual 22 A
substantially similar inquiry is made of the actus reus component,
which must also be volitional and, therefore, the product of the actor's
unencumbered desire to bring about a specific action from his
person.23 Thus, the only material difference about the free will
question, between the contexts of actus reus and mens rea involves the
point at which the undue interference with free action occurs and, in
this manner, the free will question falls at the intersection of the actus
reus and mens rea components of a crime.
Furthermore, in some instances, such as in a trial involving an
insanity or duress defense, a court might find that the bad acts of the
defendant were not the product of the defendant's conscious and
unburdened desire to act in a specific way. 24 Consequently, a court
might impose a lesser degree of culpability, or find altogether, that no
criminal liability should attach to the conduct.25 The insanity defense
has morphed over time, with its most commonly held iteration often
involving an inquiry into whether the offender had the ability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or the ability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. 2 6
Each of these areas of analysis-mens rea, actus reus, and
sanity-offers an opportunity for behavioral genetics to influence the
administration and outcome of criminal proceedings. 27 However, it is
necessary to first revisit the policies and purposes underlying the
American traditions of criminal law and punishment, as well as to
21

Id.

See Peter Westin, Getting the Flv out ofthe Bottle: The FalseProblemof
Free Will and Determinism. 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 599. 611 & 618-19 (2005)
22

("discussing different philosophical views that considerthe free problem in terms of
the desires of the actor").
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01(1).
24 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2013) (defining the elements
of
the
elements
of
an insanity defense); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2013) (defining
a duress defense).
25 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1).
26 See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01.
27

See Nita Farahany & William Bemet, BehaviouralGenetics in Criminal

Cases: Past, Present, and Future, 2 GENOMICs, Soc'Y & POL'Y 72, 72-73 (2006)

(providing background material on the subject ofusing behavioral genetics evidence
in courtroom proceedings).
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appreciate the metaphysical problem of free will as it arises in this
context. 28

A. TraditionalTheories Of CriminalPunishment

Understanding the commonly recognized objectives of criminal
law and punishment provides a much-needed first step in
understanding the importance of the concept of free will within the
subtle inner workings of the American legal system. In turn, this
illuminates the potential implications of using behavioral genetics
evidence in criminal proceedings. In the United States, commentators
and lawmakers have historically leaned upon two major theories of
criminal law to justify the imposition of punishment upon criminal
offenders: (1) retributivism, in which punishment is inflicted because
punishment is an end itself, and (2) utilitarianism, in which
punishment is inflicted as a means to an end.29 This split of
justifications reflects a deeper philosophical divide in western
philosophy, which persists in contemporary debates on morality and
ethics. 30
Retributive justice is commonly accepted as the older of the two
main justifications for punishing criminal behavior--dating back to
ancient Babylon. 31 Etched upon stone pillars, more than four thousand
years ago, the Code of Hammurabi unqualifiedly declared "an eye for

28
See generally RICHARD SORABJI, NECESSITY, CAUSE, AND BLAME:
PERSPECTIVES ON ARISTOTLE'S THEORY (2006) (providing discussionon Aristotle's
views on the free will problem); TIMOTHY O'KEEFE, EPICURUS ON FREEDOM (2005);

SUSANNE

BOBZIEN, DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN STOIC PHILOSOPHY (2002)

(taking the positionthatthe free will problem was first framed by Epicurus and the
Stoics).
29 See Randy E. Barnett, Restitution:A New ParadigmofCriminalJustice,
87 ETHICS 279, 280-81 (1977) [hereinafter Barnett, New Paradigm](providing a
snapshot explanation of some of the various theories of punishment).
0 See John-Stewart Gordon, Modern Morality and Ancient Ethics,
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/anci-mod/ (last
visited Jun. 8, 2014).
3

See generally GODFREY R DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN

LAWS (2007) (discussing the Code of Hammurabi from historical and legal
perspectives); MARTHA T. ROTH, LAw COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA

MINOR (1997) (providing compilations oflegaltexts and English translations written
between the third millennium and first millennium B.C.E., in ancient Mesopotamia
and Asia Minor).
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an eye, a tooth for a tooth." 32 This principle-lex talionis-is at the
heart of retributive justice, which more broadly conveys the idea of
"[p]unishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense
committed . . . ."33 Some commentators have argued that there is a
close connection between the concepts of retribution and revenge. 34
Yet, institutional retribution is less about satiating a need for inflicting
harm to quell inflamed passions and more about a balancing of the
scales of justice between the members of a community. 35 The
infliction of harm on the wrongdoer, through punishment, is viewed as
intrinsically good, and something which is given to satisfy the personal
needs of the aggrieved and, in some sense, the needs of the community
at large. 36 Implicit in this view is an understanding pf justice as the
balancing of harms. 37
Retribution is a tricky concept to unpack, because retribution itself
has several different, potential justifications. 38 Nevertheless, inherent
in the concept of retribution is the requirement of proportionality-that
the punishment fit the crime, as the common aphorism holds, in order

to accomplish justice through faimess. 39 It is the heart and soul of
retribution to punish only according to the moral gravity of the crime
committed and no more. 40 Within this framework, to punish any
further than warranted by the gravity of the crime is to overstep the
authority under which the punishment is administered. 41

32
3

See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 31; ROTH, supra note 31.
Retaliation, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
WHITLEY

34

PUNISHMENT
35

RP.

KAUFMAN,

HONOR AND

REVENGE:

A

THEORY OF

93 (2013).

See

RANETA LAWSON MACK & MICHAEL J. KELLY, EQUAL JUSTICE IN

THE BALANCE: AMERICA'S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING TERRORIST THREAT

17 (University of Michigan Press 2014).
36
37

See id.
1d.

38

See KAUFMAN, supranote 34, at 47-72 (discussing different justification
for retribution).
3

See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of

Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 68-75 (1992).
40 See generally KAUFMAN, supra note 34, at 171-72 (discussing the
proportionality requirement of retribution).
41 See generally Harald Hoffding, State's Authority to Punish Crime, 2 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 702-03 (1912) (commenting that "the
subjective conditionofthe will in those to whom punishment is to be administered
should be the object of attention" in justifying a state's authority to punish).
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Retributive justice links the divide between criminal culpability
and moral culpability, by establishing a relationship between
punishment and the inherent wrongness of the criminal act, rather than
limiting the application of criminal punishment to its social utility. 42
Hence, two criminals, whose actions result in substantially identical
outcomes for their victims, may be punished with varying degrees of
severity based on their relative egregiousness of the manner in which
the acts were committed or based on the motivation behind the
criminal act. 43

Retributivism also carries with it the important function of political
expression.44 Through a criminal justice system based on retributive
justice, "a political community affirms in emphatic fashion its shared
conception of the human good and the rank-ordering of morally
significant characteristics (virtues such as courage, vices such as
injustice) by rewarding those individuals whom it admires and
punishing those whose actions it condemns as immoral." 45 Retributive
justice is rather simple in the following respect: it seeks to punish bad
acts because bad acts are bad. 46

The American criminal law is infused with vestiges of the ancient
principles embodied in retributive justice. 47 The Eighth Amendment of
United States Constitution, for example, prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, which the Supreme Court has read to incorporate the idea
of proportionality between the criminal act and the punishment
42 See generallyMordechai Kremnitzer &Tatjana Hrnle, Human Dignity
and the PrincipleofCulpability, 44 ISR. L. REv. 115 (2011) (comparing German law
with Israeli law in terms of the connection between retributive justice, moral
culpability, and human dignity).
43 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2014) (listing the "mitigating and
aggravating factors to be considered in determining whether a sentence of death is
justified....").

44 See KEALLY

D. McBRIDE, PUNISHMENT

AND POLITICAL ORDER

3 (2007)

(acknowledging that "[p]unishment is seen as both an expression of and a tool for
consolidating power"butarguing that punishment is "a central problem of political
order.").
45

Arthur Shuster, Kant on the Role ofthe Retributive Outlook in Moraland
PoliticalLife, 73 THE REv. OF POL. 425, 427 (2011).
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., Judith M. Barger, Innocence Found: Retribution, Capital
Punishment, and the Eighth Amendment. 46 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1. 18 (2012) ("fl1t

appears that the Court applies a mixture of retributive theories within its Eighth
Amendment analysis."); Gerard V. Bradley, Retributionand the Secondary Aims of
Punishment, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 106-15 (1999) (discussing the role of retributive
punishment in American law).
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imposed for that act.48 A penalty may be found to proportionally
exceed a given crime and, therefore, be deemed cruel and unusual
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 49 A punishment may
also be cruel in and of itself, such as with the imposition of physical or
psychological torture 50 and the rejection of such punishments serves as
a bright-line on the limits of the concept of retribution in application.51
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has also held that
criminalizing and punishing an individual's status of being addicted to
narcotics is cruel and unusual. 52 The Supreme Court likened drug
addiction to mental illness and quoted from historical texts the
proposition that "the execution of a madman 'should be a miserable
spectacle, both against law, and of extreame [sic] inhumanity and
cruelty . . . . '"5 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized the need
for a connection between the imposition of capital punishment and
moral culpability, and engaged in justifying criminal punishment in
terms of retribution. 54
Some commentators take the position that free will is necessary for
a penal system, which is based on retributive justice, to properly
function.55 Moral responsibility, which is essential to retributive

48

See U.S.

CONST.

amend. VIII; see also Barger, supranote 47, at 18, 23-

24.
49 See O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (J. Field,
dissenting).
5o See Wilkerson v. State of Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878).
5' It is important to bear in mind that the Bill ofRights sets forth a floor of
civil liberties and not a ceiling and, as such, the Eighth Amendment does not concem
itself with under-punishment, but rather with over-punishment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. In any event, the vestiges ofretributivismare not necessarily absolute,
but are certainly present in the United States Constitution. See Bradley, supranote
47, at 114-18.
52 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
s3 Id. at 676 (quoting 6 COKE'S THIRD INST. 6 (4th ed. 1797)).

54 See id.

9

&

5 See CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN, Involuntary Crimes, VoluntarilyCommitted, in
143 (Stephen Shute
Andrew Simester eds. 2002); John Warwick Montgomery, Some Remarks on
Punishment and Freewill In Legal Theory & Classical Christian Theology, 8
(2010),
THEOLOGY
J.
CLASSIC
GLOBAL
http://www.phc.edu/UserFiles/File/_Othe/o2Projects/Global%2OJoumal/82/JWMontgomery%20Some%2ORemarks%20on%20Punishment.pdf (number 2)
(last visited Dec. 26,2013); Madeleine Udell,Neuroscience, Free Will and Criminal
Justice,
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART

justice, operates on the assumption that each actor is able to freely
select between two or more options.56 Such an actor is capable of
making decisions and that actor's morally impermissible decisions are
viewed as the appropriate subject of criminal punishment.57
Conversely, where the actor's conduct is not the product of free willnot the product of the actor's decision-making power-the actor is not
blamed for his or her conduct, or (at least in some instances) subjected
to a lesser degree of blame for his or her conduct.58 Examples of such
persons include those individuals whose actions are the product of the
will of others (such as in the case of acting under duress) and those
individuals whose actions are altogether non-volitional (such as in the
case of acting by virtue of spasms or narcolepsy). 5
Consider an inanimate object that falls and injures a human
being. 60 It would be incredible to hold that the object acted in a
morally culpable or blameworthy manner; nay, it would be incredible
to say that the object acted at all. 6 1 However, if the inanimate object
suddenly became animate and freely exercised the choice to fall and
injure a human being, society might well ascribe blame to the object.62

http://citeseerxist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=1. 1.1.368.7474&rep-rep l&type
=pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
56 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (1972) ("The courts
have emphasized overthe centuries that "free will" is the postulate of responsibility

under our jurisprudence.").
" See generallyid. at 975-83 (discussingthe imposition of punishment on
those inflicted with mental disease).
1 See Pietro Pietrini &Valentia Bambini, Homo Ferox: The Contribution
ofFunctionalBrainStudies to Understandingthe Neural Bases ofAggressive and
Criminal Behavior, 32 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 259 (2009) (commenting,
generally, on the role of free will in the criminal justice system).
5 See Finkelstein, supranote55, at 148 (discussingthe difference between
non-volitional acts which negate actus reus fromother defenses which negate mens
rea); Craig L. Carr, Duressand CriminalResponsibility, 10 L. & PHIL. 161, 161-63

(1991) (arguing in favorofrecognizing duress as a legally acceptable defense, while
maintaining that it is neither a justification or an excuse); Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Involuntary Acts and CriminalLiability, 81 ETHIcs 332, 340 (1971) ("An act or
omission is involuntary if and only if the failure or behavior in question is
explainable by factors which causally prevent the exercise of normal capacities of
control or eliminate such capacities entirely.").
60

See TRACEY ISAACS, MORAL RESPONSBLITY IN COLLECTIVE CONTEXTS

13 (Oxford University Press 2011) (describing inanimate objects as non-agents,
incapable of moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness).
61
62

See id.
Id.
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This is because the inanimate object is said to have exercised its will
and that the harm that ensued was the result of the exercise of that
will. 6 3 To eliminate the concept of free will in human conduct is to
eliminate the human potential to engage in morally blameworthy
conduct. 64 Hence, in the absence of free will, retributive justice does
not care to impose punishment. 65 As such, free will is necessary to a
functioning penal system founded upon principles of retributive
justice. 66
The utilitarian justifications of criminal punishment, which sharply
contrast with the retributive justification, each have separate objectives
and, as a general matter, none of these objectives is directly or
especially concerned with the problem of free will. 6 7 Primarily, the
utilitarian approaches to criminal punishment can be branded as
specific deterrence theory, general deterrence theory, rehabilitation
theory, or restitution theory.68 Each of these justifications shares a
unifying feature, which includes the imposition of punishment to
further specific social goals. 69
Punishment aimed at specific deterrence seeks to prevent a certain
criminal offender from engaging in further criminal conduct by
dissuading the offender from committing further crimes. 70
Incapacitation, which is a subset of specific deterrence, includes
punishments such as incarceration and the death penalty.71 An
imprisoned criminal offender's freedoms are necessarily curtailed in
63

Id.

Id.
See Barger, supra note 47, at 14.
66 See id. at 14-15.
67
See generally Wayne Viney, Pamela Parker-Martin, & Sandra D. H.
Dotten, Beliefs in Free Will and Determinismand Lack ofRelation to Punishment
Rationale and Magnitude, 115 J. GEN. PsYCHOL. 15, 15-18 (1988) (studying the
6

65

impact of the magnitude ofcrimes on utilitarian and retributivists beliefs regarding
punishment,
and noting the different goals of each theory).
68
See Barnett, New Paradigmsupra note 29, 280-85.
69 See id.
7 See MarkC. Stafford & MarkWarr,A ReconceptualizationofGeneral
and Specific Deterrence, 30 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123, 124-25 (1993)

(explaining the conventional distinction of specific and general deterrence, but
arguing against the continued use of such it).
&

7 See generally Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence
Enhancements to Distinguishbetween Deterrenceand Incapacitation,42 J.L.

Econ. 343 (1999) (distinguishing deterrence from incapacitation in empirical studies
but looking at sentencing enhancements).
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such a manner that the offender no long has the opportunity to commit
further offenses against society at large for the duration of the
incapacitation. 72 Similarly, a criminal offender who has been put to
death can no longer harm others within the community. 73
Specific deterrence's immediate efficacy is chief among the
reasons for favoring it, while high cost (for a temporary solution) is
chief among the reasons for disfavoring it. 74 An incarcerated criminal
offender cannot harm the general public, thus' establishing the
immediate efficacy of this approach. However, there remain concerns
that such an offender (if punishment is something less than the death
penalty) may nevertheless persist in criminal conduct while
incarcerated and, arguably worse, enter into a pattern of exacerbated
recidivism whereby a member of the general public may be harmed
again in the future once that individual is released.75 Thus, the
financial and institutional costs become money down the drain as some
applications of the specific deterrence theory fail to address the crime
problem in a holistic and long-term manner. 76
General deterrence theory focuses on avoiding future criminal
conduct by dissuading members of the community at large from
engaging in criminal behavior. 77 It does not aim to avoid the criminal
conduct of any specific offender. 78 Under the justification of general
deterrence, the potential imposition of a penalty is designed to
dissuade other would-be offenders from engaging in the prohibited

See generallyid. (concluding that deterrence, rather than incapacitation,
has a greater effect on crime reduction).
7
ContraMark Warr& Mark C. Stafford, PublicGoals ofPunishmentand
Supportfor the Death Penalty, 21 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 95, 95-97 (1984)
(noting that capital punishment is incompatible with specific deterrence, as it
preclude any further behavior to deter).
74 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent
72

Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261, 261 (1984)

(describing the competing views ofthe effect ofpunishment on recidivism, including
the view that punishment may exacerbate pensions toward criminal behavior).
" See id. (concerns ofrecidivismand continued criminal acts do not exist
when the punishment is lifetime imprisonment or capital punishment.).
76 See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner's Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit
Approach to Incarceration,98 IOWA L. REv. 905, 907 (2013) (noting that "many

have begunto question whether the costs from incarcerating additional prisoners
outweigh the benefits").
n See id. at 909.
71

See id.
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conduct. 7 9 For example, certain punishment for driving under the
influence may dissuade other drivers from consuming liquor or
narcotics before driving, even if that punishment does not necessarily
incapacitate the punished offender.8 0
There has been some debate over whether the key to improving the
deterrent effects of punishment is increased severity of punishment or
increased certainty of punishment.8 1 On the surface it might appear
that this particular form of utilitarian justification rests upon the
premise that potential offenders have the ability to conform their
conduct to some decision-making process on expected future utilitythat potential offenders act freely and pursuant to their own choices
and interests-since it presumes the ability of the offender to act upon
the threat of increased severity or certainty of punishment. 82 However,
neither general nor specific deterrence theories necessarily require an
exercise of free will in order to justify punishment. 8 3 Under a
deterrence theory analysis, the only justification of punishment is the
effect of the punishment and not whether that effect is the product of
free decision-making or some causally defined precondition. 84 Unlike
retributivism, utilitarianism does not even consider the free will of the
actor and, instead, focuses entirely on outcomes. 85
General deterrence theory hinges on the assumption that an actor
can make informed judgments about how to behave-with punishment
" See id.
80 See generally William N. Evans, Doreen Neville, & John D. Graham,
GeneralDeterrenceofDrunkDriving:EvaluationofRecent American Policies, 11

RISK ANALYSIS 279, 286-288 (1991) (finding that increased certainty ofpunishment
for drunk driving is more likely to result in deterrence); H. Laurence Ross, Richard
McCleary, & Gary LaFree, Can MandatoryJailLaws Deter Drunk Driving? The
Arizona Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 166 (1990) (concluding that

increased severity ofpunishment does notappearto decrease drunkdriving, but that
increased certainty of punishment may still have an impact).
8

See id.

See generally Jeremiah W. White, Is Iowa's Sexual PredatorStatute
"Civil"? The Civil CommitmentofSexually Violent PredatorsAfter Kansasv. Crane,
82

89 IOWA L. REv. 739, 761-67 (2004) (discussing the conundrum of justifying
punishment in terms of retribution or deterrence when the offender is allegedly
unable to conformtheir conduct to the requirements of the law); Ronald L. Akers,
Criminology: Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in
Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654-57

(1990).
84

See supra Part I(A), p. 10-11 and note 67.
Id.

85

Id.
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viewed as influencing that decision-making process.

86

A person, after

all, must be able to choose to refrain from illegal conduct in order for
general deterrence to operate, and the law presumes such a capacity. 87
This assumption, however, does not necessarily imply the existence of
free will in an objective sense. 88 The decision-making process may be
entirely influenced, but a certain behavior has been deterred so long as
the threat of punishment changes the outcome. 89 For example, a person
acting under extreme duress might not be acting out of free will, but is
engaged in a decision-making process that might be influenced by the
possibility of a punishment. 90 That individual might be generally
deterred from conduct, even if having avoided that conduct was not the
product of his or her free will. 91 In this way, utilitarian justifications
assume a decision-making capacity, but do not assume the type of free
will that is central to the retributivist justification. 92
The rehabilitation theory, which is similar to the moral education
theory, seeks to transform the criminal offender into a fully functional
member of society and does not ground itself in the recognition of an
offender's free will. 9 3 Similar to the deterrence theories, the
rehabilitation theory justifies punishment based on a specific outcome,
involving an alternation of the offender's future conduct through the

" See StephenJ. Morse, CriminalResponsibility and the Disappearing
Person:The GrammarofCriminalLaw, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2545, 2553-54 (2007)
[hereinafterMorse, CriminalResponsibility](describinghowthelawviews persons
and presumes a capacity to conform conduct to desires and intentions).
87

See id.

See generally id. 2552, 2575 (arguing that the law does not rely on the
objective existence offree will and that, in any event, behavioral sciences have not
and likely cannotdisproveourtraditional presumptions about the existence of free
will).
8
See generally id. at 2553-54 (explaining how the law presumes a
capacity for rational choice, such that individuals can conform their conduct to their
understanding of the law).
90 See id. at 2552-53.
9 See id. (arguing that causal accounts can account for deviations in human
behavior but that does not mean that conditions, such as mental illness or duress do
not exist).
92 See generally Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984) (setting forth the moral education
theory of punishment).
8

93 See eenerallv ChadFlanders.The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative
Ideal. 49 Ga. L. Rev. 383, 389-402 (2015) (discussing rehabilitation as a treatment,

training, and moral reform).
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imposition of that punishment. 94 For example, an individual's criminal
conduct might be the result of a biochemical or psychological malady,
and the punishment might involve some therapy to resolve the
underlying issue. 95 In this way, it is irrelevant to rehabilitation theory
whether the offender's unwanted behavior is the product of free will. 96
The concern becomes whether that individual can, through treatment
or conditioning, engage in what society views as a "rational" decisionmaking process. 9 7
"[A]rguably juvenile justice is the area in which determinism made
the greatest inroads in the law." 98 Specifically, the heavy emphasis on
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system embraces a deterministic
outlook-consistent with a utilitarian theory of punishment. 99 This
deterministic outlook frequently precludes or ignores issues related to
free will, but permits policymakers to use the act of punishment as a
tool to sculpt society, rather than limiting policymakers to accepting
social norms as they presently exist. 100
Restitution theory seeks to make whole those who have been
injured by a criminal act.101 While retribution theory seeks to balance
the scales between the offender and society at large, restitution theory
seeks to balance the scales between the offender and the victim. 102
"'Today, [victims of crimes] are too often forgotten people in our legal
system; and their cries for justice must be heard and answered' . .
[yet] restoring the victim [is] one of the 'utilitarian' or social
engineering goals of punishment." 103 As with the forgoing utilitarian
theories, restitution theory is also entirely dependent upon the
9 See generally id.
9 See generally id.
96 See id.
9 See generallyHampton,supranote 92, at 231 (discussing Georg Hegel's

account ofthe right to punishment and the presumption that the individual being
punished is rational human being).
98 Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency:Keeping Determinism Out of
CriminalLaw, 15 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 1, 27 (2005).
9 See id.
1 See id.
10' See Roger Pilon,Restitution, Punishmentor Both?, 88 ETBIcs 348, 34849 (1978) (citing Barnett, New Paradigm,supra note 29, at 279-301).
102
See Bruce L. Benson, Restitution in Theory and Practice, 12 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 75, 75-77 (1996).
103 Id. at 75 (quoting Robert J. Bidinotto, CriminalResponsibility,
in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE? THE LEGAL SYSTEM VS. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (Robert
J. Bidinotto, ed. 1994).
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consequences of the punishment and does not anticipate in any
meaningful sense the free will of the criminal offender. 104
However, some scholars view restitution theory as encompassing
aspects of retribution theory or, at least, as having a distinguishable
purpose from the other utilitarian theories.105 For example, "[f]ull
restoration arises when the victim is satisfied, not when his measurable
costs have been paid." 106 In this sense, restitution becomes merely an
instrument for effectuating retribution-for effectuating proportional
just deserts in order to satisfy the loss of the victim. 107
Yet, this view blurs the line between restitution and retribution by
treating restitution as a tool of retribution, as opposed to treating
restitution as a standalone justification of criminal punishment. 108
Also, those who view restitution as failing to maximize benefits
through distribution, and therefore as being non-utilitarian in nature,
adopt a view of utility that is overly narrow. 109 Righting wrongs and
maintaining the status quo of the natural order can most certainly be
viewed as the maximization of good in a narrow sense, but affixing a
different purpose to restitution does not change the fact that it is goal
driven and, therefore, utilitarian at its core.
Other authors have conceptualized restitution theory as a rightsbased approach, which "views a crime as an offense by one individual
against the rights of another calling for forced reparations by the
criminal to the, victim." 110 For purposes of this discussion, it is
sufficient to note that while there may be some scholarly disagreement
over the exact underpinning of restitution theory, it is generally
understood that the justification does not require a coherent notion of
free will on the part of the criminal offender.' Therefore, an absence
" See generally id. (notingthatrestitution does not account for the mens

rea componentofthe criminal act and indicatingthat restitution fails to capture the
essential differences between tort law and criminal law).
105 See,e.g.,Benson,supranote102, at 78; MARYMARGARET MACKENZIE,
PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 38-39 (1981) (noting that utilitarian purposes ofpunishment
"should be distinguished, however, from the different teleological purpose of the
theory ofrestitution, which is not utilitarian at all .... [flor restitution goes no way
towards increasing benefit, for many or for one; it simply aims to cancel out harm").
106 Benson, supra note 102, at 78.
10 See id.

See id.
See MACKENZIE, supra note 105, at 39.
110 Randy Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. JUR. 117, 117
10
109

(1980).
.nSee generally id. (discussingthe restitutiontheory criminal punishment)
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of free will does not undermine the theories of specific deterrence,
general deterrence, rehabilitation, or restitution.
B. Free Will in an Increasingly Deterministic Culture
"From its earliest beginnings, the problem of 'free will' has been
intimately connected with the question of moral responsibility." 112
"Most of the ancient thinkers on the problem were trying to show that
we have control over our decisions, that our actions 'depend on us',
and that they are not pre-determined by fate, by arbitrary gods, by
logical necessity, or by a natural causal determinism."11 3 However,
contemporary developments in our understanding of the unseen forces
at work in human behavior have brought about a renewed sense that
there is nothing in this world that cannot be explained in terms of
causation.11 4 Developments have emerged in fields like neuroscience,
physics, and genetics that raise doubt in classrooms and courtrooms
alike as to the agency of human beings.' 15
As scientific disciplines progress and we learn more and more
about the building blocks of human life, our zeitgeist has become
increasingly fatalistic.11 6 Unfailingly, science has threatened to unveil
the hidden causes of human experience and with this unveiling the
certainty of free will promises to shrivel under the magnifying glass of
what may be perceived as an enlightened attitude. 11 7 Unsurprisingly,
112 Bob Doyle, History ofthe

Free Will Problem, THE INFO. PHILOSOPHER,

http//www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/history/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2013).
113

id.
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1 See Joshua D. Greene & Jonathan D. Cohen, Forthe Law, Neuroscience
ChangesNothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL Soc'Y
OF LONDON B 1775, 1777 (2004).
's See id.
116

Are

You

See e.g. FrankFuredi,Is That BiologicalDeterminism in Your Genes, or
Gaga About Free Will?, The Australian (Feb. 19, 2011),

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/is -that-biological-determinism-in-yourgenes-or-are-you-gaga-about-free-will/story-e6frg6zo-1226008077137 (discussing
biological determinism in contemporary music); CAROLE CALDWALLADR, THE

FAMiLY TREE (2005) (exemplifying biological determinism in contemporary
literature); American Horror Story: Asylum, Continuum, (Jan. 16, 2013)

(exemplifying biological determinism in popular television fiction).
117 See, e.g.,Chun Siong Soon, et al., Unconscious Determinants ofFree
Decisionsin the Human Brain, 11 NAT URE NEUROSCIENCE 543 (2008) (finding "that
the outcome ofa decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal
cortexup to 10 s before it enters awareness"); Patrick Haggard, Decision Time for
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then, commentators in this area have remarked that "any scientifically
respectable discussion of free will requires the rejection of . . . the
'panicky metaphysics' of libertarianism . . . " and, with it, the

possibility that "somewhere deep in the brain, there are mysterious
events that operate independently of the ordinary laws of physics and
"118
that are somehow tied to the will of the brain's owner ...
A brief lexicography follows here. Determinism, as it is commonly
understood, refers to the idea "that all events, including human actions
and choices, are, without exception, totally determined." 119
Indeterminism, in contrast, refers to the idea "that some events are not
determined."1 20 Generally, the commonsense notion of free will seems
incompatible with the idea of determinism.121 After all, if an outcome
is predetermined, how is it possible to have changed the outcome by
exerting free will? 12 2 Furthermore, if our desires and inclinations are
themselves the products of causal influences, is not "free will" merely
another way of describing a causal influence (albeit internal to the
actor)?1 23 For many, the very idea of will or control seems downright
nonsensical if we accept that everything is determined.1 24 This
foregoing argument is commonly referred as the problem of free
will.

125

"Compatibalism" presents a contrary view, holding that
determinism remains compatible with the idea of free will1 26 For
many compatibalists, the problem of free will is not a problem at all,
Free Will, 69 NEURON 404 (2011) (discussing the implications for human volitional
movement raised by electrical recordings of the medial frontal lobe of the human
brain); Itzhak Fried, et al., InternallyGeneratedPreactivationofSingle Neurons in
Human Medial FrontalCortex Predicts Volition, 69 NEUORON 548 (2011).
118 Greene & Cohen, supra note 114.
119
JOEL FEINBERG & Russ
SHAFER-LANDAU,
REASON AND
RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN SOME BASIC PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY 386 (12th ed.
2005).
120 See id.
121 See id. at 386-87
122 See id.
123
124

See id.

See generally Robert H. Kane, Free Will, Determinism, and
Indeterminism, in BETWEEN CHANCE AND CHOICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERMINISM

371-406 (Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C.

Bishop, eds. 2002) (Robert H. Kane in often thought of as a hard incompatibalist
who favors the view that free will exists and that causation is indeterminate).
125 See id.
126 See
id.
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but merely a matter of semantics and differing meanings. 127
Compatibalists often redefine the meaning of "free will," sometimes in
a manner that seems at odds with conventional notions of the phrase,
in order to sidestep or overcome the problem. 128 The celebrated
philosopher, Schopenhauer, once wrote that "[m]an can do what he
wills but he cannot will what he wills."1 2 9 However, as exemplified by
famed philosopher Immanuel Kant, others have found this position to
be "petty word-jugglery" and nothing more than a "wretched
subterfuge."1 30
Furthermore, the problem of free will is intimately associated with
the problem of evil, which posits that there is very little if any meaning
left to the idea of evil in a world in which there is no free will-no
uncaused choice by actors.1 31 Many of history's greatest minds have
argued, convincingly, and probably correctly, that there can be no evil
without free will.1 32 In theological debates, the problem of free will is
redubbed the problem of evil and is seen as the natural consequence of
an omnipotent deity.1 33 A meaningful discussion of the problem of evil
is far beyond the scope of this article.1 34 However, it is sufficient to
note that the same arguments may be made with respect to moral
blame and, with it, criminal responsibility.1 35
Legal concepts like "duress" or "compelled self-incrimination"
appear to lose all meaning and application in a world in which all
127

See Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem

of Free Will and Determinism, 8 Buff. Crim. L.R. 599, 605 (2005).
128 See
id.
129 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Freedom ofthe Will (1839),
in MORRIS
ZUCKER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AMERICAN HISTORY : THE

HISTORICAL

FIELD THEORY

531, 536-37 (1945).
130 IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 189-90 (1788)
(Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1956).
131 See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WIL (2004).
132 See generally PEREBOOM, supranote 131; Kenneth Einar Himma, The
Free-WillDefense:Evil andthe Moral Value ofFree Will, 45 RELIGIOUS STUD. 395
(2009) (discussing the problem of evil and its correlate the free will problem in
philosophy).
133
See generally WILLIAM OCKHAM, PREDESTINATION, GOD'S
FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND FUTURE CONTINGENTS (M.M. Adams & N. Kretzmann

trans., 1983) (discussing the paradoxof omniscience and evil/free will).
134
See generally PETER VAN INWAGEN, THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (2006)
(providing additional information on the subject).
135 See generallyRothenberg& Wang, supranote 8 (describing the social
effects of determinism); PEREBOOM, supra note 131 (discussing life without free
will); Himma, supra note 132 (discussing free will and the problem of evil).
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things are caused. 136 Some research has even suggested that the very
notion of free will, within the minds of actors, results in "socially and
culturally desirable" behavior even if it does not actually exist. 137 In
this way, the very illusion of free will is powerful enough to alter how
laypersons view their own actions and the extent to which those
actions conform to social and cultural norms.13 8 Thus, the problem of
free will is of significant concern to laypersons, to the religious, and to
academics-all of whom have struggled to make sense of the human
experience in light of scientific discovery. 139
Findings in the behavioral sciences, such as behavioral genetics,
neurosciences, and psychology, tend to lend feasibility and credence to
the perception that all human behavior is "caused," which implies that
all human conduct is determined and not the product of free will,
thereby undermining our understanding of moral and criminal
culpability. 140 However, this view is not without its critics.141 For
example, the commentators Farahany and Coleman have argued that
"[h]uman behavioral genetics and neuroscience may enhance our
understanding of human behavior and yet have little relevance to
assigning responsibility in the criminal law." 42 Farahany and
Coleman's conclusion is based on several observations which fairly
represent some of the most common arguments against the view that

136

See generally Lawrence Newman & Lawrence Weitzer, Duress, Free

Will and the CriminalLaw, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1957) (discussing duress andthe
free will problem); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of

Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979) (discuss free will in the context ofvoluntary
confessions).
117 See generally Roy F. Baumeister, et al., Free Will as Advanced Action
Controlfor Human Social Life andCulture,4 NEUROETHICS 1 (2011) (describing the

effects of a belief in free will on human behavior).
138 See generally id.

13 See generally id.; Suheil Laher, Free Will and Determinismfrom a
Scientific and Religious Perspective, MUSLIMMATTERS.ORG (Nov. 23, 2011),
availableathttp://muslimmatters.org/2011/11/23/free-will-and-determinism-from-ascientific-and-religious -perspective/,
140 See Greene & Cohen, supra note 114.
141 See generally Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman Jr., Genetics,
Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAw 183 (Nita Farahany ed. 2009) (arguing that behavioral
genetics does not pose a problem to assessing responsibility for criminal law
purposes)
142 Id. at 183
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behavioral determinism will eventually reshape our legal landscape,
and it is worth addressing each point here.1 43
First, Farahany and Coleman claim that the findings of
neuroscience and behavioral genetics do not support a view of
behavioral determinism because such findings reveal "a complex
interaction of biology and the environment that gives rise to behavioral
differences between individuals."l 44 However, simply put, Farahany
and Coleman's conclusion does not follow from their premise. 145 The
complexity of causal interactions does not detract from the
metaphysical concern that genes, environments, and gene/environment
interactions appear to account for the entirety of human behavior.1 46
This proposition, in turn, necessarily gives rise to the perception that
all human behavior is entirely caused by one force or another and
precludes the possibility of a libertarian's metaphysical account of free
will.1 4 7 Whether those causes and interactions are so complex that they
are nigh imperceptible might affect the usefulness of such observations
in daily life or perhaps even undermine their present usefulness in the
assessment of moral blame, but complexity does not in itself implicate
non-determinism. 148
Second, Farahany and Coleman observe that neuroscience and
behavioral genetics studies operate by exploring probabilities in the
population at large, without identifying specific causal mechanisms
behind a given individual's actions.1 49 This observation, while perhaps
poignant at first blush, is increasingly becoming a lesser concern in
this arena. 15 0 The design studies used in behavioral genetics were
classically aimed at establishing mere correlations, but modern design
studies are geared toward discovering specific causal mechanismsand in some instances have done so.' 5 ' As such, while Farahany and

143

See id. at 183-84.

144 See id.
145

Contra id.

146

Contra Farahany & Coleman, supra note 141, at 183-84.

Contra id.; see generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF
CONSCIOUS WILL (2002) (arguing that free will is a matter of perception).
147

Contra Farahany & Coleman Jr., supra note 141, at 184-240.
See id. at 184.
1so Contra id.
1s1
See Laura A. Baker et al., Behavioral Genetics: The Science of
Antisocial Behavior, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 2-11 (2006). Examples of classic
and modem design studies are explored further in the following sections, which look
at the XYY studies versus the MAOA studies. See infra Part III.
148
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Coleman's argument might have carried greater weight in the past, it
carries lesser weight now and will likely become even less impactful
in the future. 152
One interpretation of the results of such studies may well be that
there are causal connections between genes and human behaviors, and
science is, of course, a matter of hypothesis and testing-an exercise
in moving from general principles to specific explanations through
observation and then later expanding on those principles through
deductive reasoning.1 53 To claim that a hypothesis is unproven or
unsubstantiated is not the same thing as claiming that the data does not
support the hypothesis. 154 To conflate the two propositions avoids the
real question posed and undermines the subsequent analysis. 155 Again,
the premise on which Farahany and Coleman's base their conclusion is
inadequate to lead to such a definitive position.1 56
Third, Farahany and Coleman argue that "studies in both fields
reveal that even if biological differences provide insight into why
individuals behave as they do, biology contributes only one part of the
overall story." 157 Farahany and Coleman are no doubt referring to the
role of environmental influences in determining human behavior.1 58
Yet, Farahany and Coleman's reasoning incorrectly assumes that
because environmental causes contribute to behavior that there can be
no behavioral determinism. 159 Therefore, the same issues inherent in
the aforementioned "complexity" argument can be applied to this
argument as well1 60 Whether causation is viewed as a chain or as a
web is not at issue in the problem of behavioral determinism, which
concerns itself instead with whether the outcome has a component that
is not predetermined.161 As before, Farahany and Coleman's
Contra Farahany & Coleman Jr., supra note 141, at 184.
See generally Anton E. Lawson, What Is the Role ofInduction and
Deduction in Reasoning and Scientific Inquiry?, 42 J. REs. Sci. TEACHING 716
(2005) (discussing theuse ofinductionanddeductionin the scientific process); Wilf
8 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL.
Backhaus,Hume'sForkandAnalytic/TriflingPropositions,
79 (1994) (explaining the relationship of inductive and deductive reasoning,
sometimes described as "Hume's fork").
154 See generally Lawson, supra note 153.
152

153

155

See id.

156

Contra Farahany & Coleman Jr., supra note 141, at 185.

1
158

Id. at 184-85.

See id.
See id.
160 Contra id.
" See Farahany & Coleman Jr., supranote 141, at 184-85.
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conclusion simply does not follow from their premise because the
inclusion of environmental influences into the calculus of determining
human behavior does not directly or indirectly undermine the view that
genetic influence is a causal factor. 162
Other commentators have also taken up the mantle of challenging
the relevance or impact of behavioral genetics on American law.1 6 3
Greene and Cohen suggest that behavioral genetics will have little
impact on criminal proceedings under the current state of American
law because the law "assumes that people have a general capacity for
rational choice . . . ." and issues of criminal responsibility will "turn on
questions about rationality."1 64 However, Greene and Cohen's position
does not account for the carefully constructed legal distinctions
between general and specific intent, the latter of which looks for actual
choices that were made by a criminal offender to bring about a certain
outcome and is not satisfied by a mere general capacity for rational
choice. 165 It also ignores the fact that, often times, laypersons sitting as
jurors will be called upon to assess the propriety of a punishment and
that such jurors will not engage in the sophistry necessary to
appreciate the difference between free will and a general capacity for
choice. 166
Furthermore, Greene and Cohen's argument does not fully address
the very problem facing American jurisprudence.1 6 7 To say that the
law assumes that individuals are generally capable of rational choice is
Compare JAMES V. WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION
OF MIND (Harvard University Press 1988) and ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON
COGNITIVE ABILITIES (Robert J. Stembergand Elena L. Grigorenko, eds. 2001) with
162

Albert Bandura, The SelfSystem in ReciprocalDeterminism, 33 AM.

PSYCHOLOGIST

344 (1978) (describing the determinismofhuman behavior, underthe social leaming
model, in terms of a dynamic and reciprocal process of behavioral, cognitive, and
environmental influences) andROBERT PLOMIN,BEHAVIORAL GENETICS (MacMillan
2008).
163 See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 114; Emad Hanzala Atiq, How
Folk Beliefs about Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Targetfor the NeuroDeterminist Critics ofCriminalLaw, 16 NEw CRIM. L. REV. 449 (2013).
164

Greene & Cohen, supranote 114, at 1778.

165

See id.
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See id.

See Kadri Vihvelin, Choice, Alternatives, and Moral Responsibility,
VIHVELIN.COM
(Jul.
20,
2010,
10:08PM),
167

http://vihvelin.typepad.com/vihvelincom/2010/07/choice-alternatives-and-moralresponsibility.html("Common sense and tradition say that free will is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition ofhavingthe kinds ofchoices that we care about.").
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to say the law assumes that individuals generally have free will and
that their actions are made to conform to some desire which is the
product of this will-after all, what is the meaning of "choice" if there
is no such thing as will to exercise that choice or if that choice is the
product of something other than free will?1 68 Free will and choicethe meanings of these two concepts are so deeply intertwined that they
cannot be competently discussed in isolation.1 69 The assumption of the
ability to make a choice-a real unencumbered choice-is the very
assumption of the legal system that is undermined by the blossoming
science of behavioral genetics over the past few decades and,
generally, of all behavioral sciences over the past century.1 70 The
distinction set forth by Greene and Cohen is a distinction without a
difference, as it does not directly confront the problem of free will in
this context.171
Nevertheless, Greene and Cohen do note that if the sciences
change social attitudes regarding criminal responsibility, such attitudes
will ultimately change the law.1 72 Another commentator, Emad
Hanzala Atiq, has posed a similar position; rejecting the contention
that problematic assumptions about free will underlie substantive legal
doctrine/retributive theory, but accepting that assumptions about free
will underlie the moral decisions of everyday actors in sentencing
hearings.1 73 Regardless of the debate surrounding the value of free will
within criminal jurisprudence, there is some consensus that behavioral
sciences undermine traditional sociological perceptions of criminal
responsibility and that the same will play a role in shaping our criminal
justice system. 174 A clash between these forces has occurred in some
courts and will continue to occur. 175 These issues are further explored
See id.
See id.
17 See generally Eddy Nahmias,IsNeurosciencethe Death ofFree Will?,
N.Y.
TIMES:
The
Stone,
(Nov.
13,
2011,
5.25PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the-death-of-freewill!?_php-true& type=blogs& r-O (discussing the impact ofbehavioral science on
our understanding of free will).
"' Contra Greene & Cohen, supra note 114.
172 See id.
173 See Atiq, supra note 163.
174 See Ronald Rychlak & Joseph Rychlak, MentalHealthExperts on Trial:
Free Will andDeterminism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 193, 196 (1997);
see generally SAM HARRIS, FREE WILL (2012) (arguing that neuroscience
undermines our traditional notions offree will and prove that all choices are caused).
171 See infra Part
III.
168
169
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in the following section, which deals with behavioral genetics, what
those genetics have to say about criminal and antisocial behavior, and
the application of such knowledge in the criminal law.1 76
II.

BEHAVIORAL GENETICS

& APPLICATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW

Crime "runs" in families.' 7 7 Astonishingly, a number of research
studies have shown that, "in general, fewer than 10% of the families in
any community account for more than 50% of that community's
criminal offenses." 178 It has also been noted that, within some
individual families, criminal activity may occur from one generation to
the next with a higher incidence than .in the general population.' 7 9
Whether this startling concentration of criminal behavior is the result
of genetic or environmental causes has been the subject of much
research. 80 However, in the past few decades, human behavior
research has shifted from a social learning model to "a more balanced
perspective in which both genetic and environmental factors are
understood to explain the wide variations observed in human
behavior."' 8 ' This part looks at the role of genetic causation in
antisocial and criminal behavior, by analyzing some of the major
studies that have taken place in the field of behavioral genetics and
then examining the potential application of those studies in the
contexts of criminal adjudication and sentencing.1 82
A. Genetic Causation & Antisocial/CriminalBehavior
The enhanced role of genetics studies in human behavior research
and literature has been buttressed by evidence generated by a variety
176
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of research designs such as twin/adoptee studies, psychiatric outcome
studies, and studies on antisocial behavior correlates (impulsivity,
sensation-seeking, risk-taking, and callousness). 183 In recent years,
human research designs have branched out into two major
approaches.1 84 The longstanding, classical approach analyzes human
behavior in the context of genetic and environmental relatedness
between individuals. 185 For example, a classic study may consider and
compare the behaviors of twins in an effort to parse inherited "genetic"
traits from learned "social" traits.1 86 Other studies might explore
similar phenomena among immediate or distantly related individuals
by gauging genetic distribution patterns and environmental factors as
they relate to behavioral expressions among individuals.' 8 7
In contrast, the newer, modern approach revolves around
identifying specific DNA sequences and testing for functional
significance.18 8 Patently, this second approach has arisen as a result of
advances in the genetic sciences generally, which have ushered in an
era wherein identifying specific DNA sequences is cheaper and easier
to accomplish in a lab.1 89 A modem study, accordingly, would do
much more than merely conjecture about the impact of a hypothetical
gene on human behavior.1 90 Rather, a modem study would identify a
specific gene and that gene's function, in addition to understanding the
correlation between a behavior and a related gene.191 This change in
study designs likely reflects the much needed transition from
analyzing genetics as a risk factor to the considerably more useful
approach of identifying causal connections between individual genes
and human conduct.1 92 Of course, this transition has also intensified
the complexity of the conclusions reached by such studies, which often
reveal a web of interactions among multiple genes, as well as
environmental forces that act upon gene expression and the
1'
184
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interactions between those genes and various other environmental
influences that can result in certain patterns of human behavior. 193
Family, twin, and adoption studies are, perhaps, the most iconic
representations of the classic approach to identifying a relationship
between genes and criminal/antisocial behavior. 194 In traditional twin
studies, researchers examine the phenotypes of monozygotic twins
(who share an exact genetic identity) with dizygotic twins (who share
an average of fifty percent of their genetic identities), against the
backdrop of shared and unshared environments.1 95 In doing so,
researchers have assessed the effects of genotypes versus
environments on the expression of specific human behaviors. 196 In the
Lyons I study, researchers examined 3,226 pairs of male twins from
the Vietnam War Era Twin Registry to assess the roles of genetic and
environmental factors on various antisocial behaviors.197 The
methodology of the study involved telephonically administering the
Diagnostic Interview Schedule Version III of the DSM-III-R to
measure the juvenile and adult anti-social personality disorder
symptoms in each research participant.1 98
The results of the Lyons I study included findings that, among
juveniles, an equal number of symptoms (characterized as belonging to
antisocial behavior disorder) were both significantly heritable and
significantly influenced by shared environments.1 99 By contrast, in
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adults, a higher number of symptoms were found to be heritable, and
the number of symptoms significantly influenced by environments was
reduced to one. 200 However, the environmental factors that related to
adult manifestations of antisocial behaviors completely overlapped
with those influences that worked upon juvenile behaviors and,
conversely, the genetic factors that had the greatest influence on
juvenile behaviors overlapped with the genetic factors that had the
greatest influence on adult behaviors. 201 The study found that genetic
causes accounted for more variance in adult traits by a multiplier of
six. 20 2 In sum, the results indicated that genetic factors remain constant
in their influence on behavior as individuals mature and enter their
adulthoods, while the impact of environmental factors will diminish. 203
Interestingly, the Lyons I study appears to support the conclusion
that while environments played a major role in the adolescent
antisocial personality traits, the onset of adulthood shifted the
emphasis from external influences to genetic factors.204 The study's
findings also generally support the view that there is a causal
relationship between genetics and certain classes or types of
behavior-albeit a complex relationship-the exact nature of which
may not yet be fully understood by behavioral geneticists. 205
Consistent conclusions were reported in another study by the Lyons
team, which reported on the roles of genetic and environmental causes
in criminal conduct of the same twins described in the Lyons I
study. 206 The methodology of the Lyons II criminal behavior study
included the data collection of self-reported accounts of criminal
conduct by the 3,226 male twin pairs identified in the Vietnam War
Era Twin Registry. 207 The Lyons II study similarly found that while
environments were especially influential in juvenile criminal behavior
patterns, the onset of adulthood diminished the impact of such causes
and environments both act upon human behavior. The real issue is to what degree
does each act as a causal factor of the symptom.
200 Id. at 906 &
910.
201
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and saw a rise in the level of influence of the genetic background of
the individuals. 208
The findings of the Lyons I and Lyons II studies illustrate that even
our modem understanding of complex gene/environment interactions
has additional layers, such as aging and maturity. 20 9 There may well be
other factors that have not been uncovered or identified, which play a
role in the expression of specific behaviors. 210 To ever assume that
there can be a one to one causal relationship between a gene and a
particular behavior would be, at best, a foolish mistake and, at worst, a
misrepresentation of our current understanding of human behavior,
whose underlying causal mechanism form a web-work of causes rather
than a causal chain. 211 However, while human behavior may or may
not always be the product of genetic and environmental interactions,
the aforementioned studies did indicate that in adulthood genetic
factors exert a greater influence over human behavior than in
adolescence. 212 Thus, as individuals age their genetics may become
more important than their environments as predictors of behavior. 213
This conclusion in itself may be sufficient to raise concerns about
determinism and its impact on how we assess criminal and moral
responsibility. 214
Similar studies have been conducted using groups of adoptees, to
determine whether the severance of the biological parent/child
relationship undermines the biological correlate of criminal behavior
by excluding obvious social correlates. 215 For example, one of the
earliest criminal behavior adoption studies took place in Iowa, where
researchers measured the criminal behavior of individuals in two
groups of adoptees. 216 In the Iowa study, the behavioral history of one
group of adoptees, consisting of fifty-two children, born to forty-one
208
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convicted female offenders, was compared to a control group of
children whose parents did not have a history of committing criminal
acts. 217 The test group of children born to the convicted inmates
included seven known criminal offenders, whereas the control group
of children born to non-criminal parents included a scant single,
known criminal offender. 218 Again, the subjects of these studies were
adoptees, giving rise to the inference that the apparent biological
connection underlying criminal behavior cannot be explained away in
terms of simple environmental influences. 219
Similar results have been noted in studies conducted in other parts
of the world. 220 For example, in Sweden researchers found that "a
biological background positive for criminality contributed to an
increased risk of criminality in the adopted-away children . . . ."221 The
severance of environmental ties in the adoption scenario suggests that
while environmental factors may or may not contribute to the
expression of certain behavioral patterns, the absence of certain types
of environments from backgrounds of criminal offenders does not
necessarily preclude criminality, while indicating a correlation with
genetic causes. 2 2 2 In Denmark, researchers found that "as the number
of biological parental convictions increased, the rate of adoptees with
court convictions increased . . . ."223 While there have been some
inconsistencies in the results of twin and adoptee studies, such errors
might be the result of differences in design rather than an
inconsistency in correlations between genetic factors and behavioral
variances. 224
It is important to acknowledge and account for the aforementioned
inconsistencies, and one method of doing so is through metaanalysis. 22 5 One
pertinent meta-analysis
reviewed fifty-one
Id. at 785.
Id.at 787.
219 See generally
id.
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twin/adoption studies to assess the relative magnitude of genetic and
environmental influences on aggressive behaviors associated with
antisocial/criminal conduct. 226 Rhee and Waldman found that "[t]he
best fitting model included moderate proportions of variance due to
additive genetic influences (.32), nonadditive genetic influences (.09),
shared environmental influences (.16), and nonshared environmental
influences (.43)."1227 Miles and Carey concluded that "heritability for
aggression" accounts "for as much as 50% of the variance." 228 Among
their conclusions, Miles and Carey noted that "[c]ommon environment
has been very important in juvenile delinquency, whereas genes have
been relatively more important for adult criminality." 229 Again, these
findings are consistent with the results of the Lyons I and Lyons II
studies, discussed above. 230 This shift in the interplay between genes
and environment, which depends on the age of the study participants
and the possible differences in the environments used in those studies,
may account for a significant part of the inconsistency in results
among twin/adoptee studies. 231
As the foregoing studies illustrate, behavioral genetics research has
spent decades circling the path of identifying behavior correlates
without identifying specific genes or causality. 232 In recent years,
however, the monoamine oxidase a ("MAOA") gene, sometimes
colorfully referred to as the "warrior gene," has attracted significant
attention from scientists and media outlets. 233 The MAOA gene carries
genetic instructions for production of the MAOA enzyme, which
assists in the metabolism of norepinephrine (noradrenaline),
epinephrine (adrenaline), serotonin, and dopamine in the human
body. 2 3 4 Serotonin, noradrenaline, and dopamine are neurotransmitters
See id. at 491.
227 Id. at 490; see generallyMiles & Carey, supra note 180 (surveying 24
studies on the relationship of genes to aggressive behavior).
228 Miles & Carey, supra note 180, at 213.
229
See id. at 214 (explaining the phenomenon of diminishing
environmental influence using the "smorgasbord" theory-the theory that adults
select environments more consistent with their genotypes whereas adolescents have
no control over their own surroundings).
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231 See generallyLyons 1, supra note 197; Lyons II, supra
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(molecules that allow neurons in the brain to communicate with each
other), which work in unison to regulate mood and which play an
important role in the reward/response and mood regulation systems of
the brain. 235 It has been well established that changes in the
metabolism of serotonin, noradrenaline, and dopamine can result in
increased aggressive behavior and decreased impulse control. 236 Both
aggression and impulsiveness are known correlates to violent criminal
behavior. 237
In 1993, Dr. Han G. Brunner published the results of a study that
analyzed the genetic and behavioral background of a large Dutch
family in which there was high prevalence of mild to borderline
mental retardation, abnormal behavior patterns (including disturbed
regulation of impulsive aggression), as well as documented
antisocial/criminal behavior such as arson, attempted rape,
exhibitionism, and suicide. 238 The study identified eight affected
males, living in four different geographic locations, seven of whom
had failed to complete their primary school education and all of whom
were unemployed. 239 The familial history of abnormal behavior
included aggression, which "was usually triggered by anger and was
often out of proportion to the provocation." 24 0
Dr. Brunner found that the affected family members had either a
complete or partial deficiency of the MAOA enzyme caused by a
genetic mutation carried on the X chromosome. 241 In essence, the
Monoamine OxidaseA andB Genes ExhibitIdenticalExon-IntronOrganization, 88
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study generally correlated MAOA deficiency with an elevated
prevalence of aggressive, antisocial, and criminal behavior, while
simultaneously identifying a specific genetic component that caused
this deficiency. 242 Dr. Brunner, some thought, had found the gene
responsible for violent criminal behavior. 243 However, such a
groundbreaking development is never quite as simple as it might at
first seem.
It comes as no surprise that childhood abuse has a strong
correlation to the development of anti-social behaviors in those
children suffering from mistreatment. 244 "Boys who experience
abuse-and, more generally, those exposed to erratic, coercive, and
punitive parenting-are at risk of developing conduct disorders,
violent
and
of becoming
personality
symptoms,
antisocial
offenders." 245 However, children exhibit significant differences in
resilience and ability to return to normal function in later life. 246
Caspi et al. posited that while the exact reason for these differences
is unknown, genetic susceptibility to adverse environments may
account for the variance. 2 47 "Circumstantial evidence suggests the
hypothesis that childhood maltreatment predisposes most strongly to
adult violence among children whose MAOA is insufficient to
constrain
maltreatment-induced
changes
to
neurotransmitter
248
systems."
Thus, the role of MAOA deficiency identified by Dr.
Brunner was likely only part of the gene-environment interaction that
fully accounts for the violent criminal behavior observed in research
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participants, the impact of which was itself dependent on whether the
enzyme's production was partially or fully absent. 249
The complexity of the relationship between the MAOA gene and
human behavior is even greater than a simple gene-environment
interaction. 250 The Caspi et al. study noted that while complete MAOA
deficiency (such as in the Brunner study) is rare, more common
mutations in MAOA gene promoters do result in higher or lower
MAOA production. 25 1 In this way, the gene comes in different "shades
of gray" and operates along a spectrum. Similarly, abuse comes in
many different forms and with different degrees of severity. Armed
with an understanding that such variables exist, it becomes quite clear
that genes cannot take all the blame for human behavior, even if they
do account for at least part of the causal web. 252
The Caspi et al. study evaluated the roles of childhood
maltreatment and genetic polymorphisms effecting the production of
MAOA in 1,037 children. 253 "Between the ages of 3 and 11, 8% of the
study children experienced 'severe' maltreatment, 28% experienced
'probable' maltreatment, and 64% experienced no maltreatment." 254
The results of the study revealed that in male children with high
MAOA activity, childhood mistreatment has a much weaker impact on
the development of antisocial behavior. 255 Conversely, male children
with low MAOA activity demonstrated a higher degree of correlation
between mistreatment and antisocial tendencies. 256 It is worthwhile to
note that the study analyzed antisocial behavior in terms of violent
offense
convictions,
disposition towards violence, antisocial
personality disorder, and conduct disorder, and found the same result
across all four behavioral expressions. 257
The results of the Caspi et al. study have been replicated, many
times, thereby adding credibility to the hypothesis that an MAOA
deficiency acts upon the ability of a child to recover from the
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psychological impacts of severe childhood abuse. 258 The Kim-Cohen
et al. study, for instance, successfully recreated the results of the Caspi
et al. study and conducted a meta-analysis of five other studies, which
also confirmed the study's findings and correlations. 259 Among these
studies, low MAOA production and childhood maltreatment regularly
resulted in doubling the frequency of the antisocial/criminal
behavior. 260 However, the predictive value of these correlations
remains tenuous. 2 6 1
The effect of MAOA only reflects one gene product within the
serotoneric and dopamineric pathways as well as other related
systems. These systems are composed of thousands of gene
products. Any single genetic marker in these systems will not
affect any complexsocial behaviors, aggression, or any other, to a
great degree. Rather, finding that a specific MAOA genotype
emerges significant in interaction with early life events, helping
predict aggression, most likely reflects that this pathway is
significant in the emergence of this behavior. Thus, this specific
genotype is only the tip of the iceberg.262
Furthermore, even if behavioral genetics can be used to predict
criminal conduct with any material degree of probability, there

remains the significant challenge of translating that information into
meaningful policy and ethics principles. 2 63 For instance, as will be
discussed in the following subsections, the issue in most criminal

adjudications is not whether a defendant was prone to crime but
whether the crime at issue was the product of a gene or
gene/environment interaction.264 Regardless of the potential for
258 See Julia Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and GeneEnvironment InteractionPredictingChildren'sMental Health:New Evidence and
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misapplication, either through misunderstandings of the import of such
scientific evidence or through the imprecision inherent in the science
underlying such evidence, the science of behavioral genetics has
repeatedly found its way into courtrooms and, thus, must be explored
in the context of the practice of criminal law. 2 65
MAOA is not the only gene associated with potential criminality.
There has been some research conducted on the 5-HTT gene,
sometimes known as the SLC6A4 gene, on depression. 266 In sum, one
study "found that individuals with one or two copies of the short allele
'exhibited more depressive symptoms, diagnosable depression,
suicidality in relation to stressful life events' than individuals with two
long alleles." 2 6 7 The 5-HTT "increases the reuptake of serotonin,

which leads to the termination of its action." 268 In turn, changes in
serotonin (as can be seen in the MAOA scenarios) can affect the
frequency of aggressive human behaviors. 269 Specifically, research has
suggested a causal relationship between serotonin deficiencies and
antisocial behaviors, as well as aggression and impulsiveness. 270 Of
course, many such behaviors are associated with crimes and, thus, the
argument goes, changes in the 5-HTT might result in an increased
incidence of criminal behavior. 27 1 It should be noted that the same line
of reasoning could be made of any biological condition that reduces or
interferes with serotonin levels, such an illness or injury. 272
265 See generally DeborahW. Denno, Courts'IncreasingConsiderationof
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In addition to research studies, there are number of high-profile
anecdotes about the existence of a neuro-biological component to
criminal behavior that further support the deterministic outlook of
human behavior. 273 One such case involved the surprising lineage of
convicted murderer Jeffrey Landrigan, who unsuccessfully appealed
his criminal convictions in the United States Supreme Court. 274 Mr.
Landrigan's appeal was based on the theory that his trial court counsel
was ineffective for having failed to explore a biological explanation to
Mr. Landrigan's criminal conduct. 275 His argument failed however,
and the United States Supreme Court found that even if counsel had
obtained mitigating evidence, Mr. Landrigan had instructed his
counsel not to present any such evidence to the lower court. 276 Thus,
any error on the part of counsel in failing to obtain mitigating evidence
did not result in Mr. Landrigan's sentencing and could not be the basis
of a successful appeal. 277 However, this left open the question of
whether competent legal representation requires counsel to research a
biological cause to a criminal defendant's behavior. 278
Mr. Landrigan's history of criminal behavior was apparently
lengthy and egregious. 279 In 1982, he was convicted of second-degree
murder.280 While serving time for that murder, Mr. Landrigan's
anticipated imprisonment was lengthened because he stabbed a fellow
inmate. 281 A few years later, he escaped his prison and fled to Arizona
where he committed yet another, manifestly violent murder.282
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Ultimately, a trial court sentenced Mr. Landrigan to death. 283 While
Mr. Landrigan was on death row, he learned the identity of his
estranged father when a fellow inmate brought a resemblance to his
attention. 284

Mr. Landrigan's biological father was also a deathrow inmate. 2 8 5
Despite having never met his biological father or mother, Mr.
Landrigan's history of violent criminal behavior also resembled that of
his biological father. 286 Adding to the uncanny nature of these
circumstances and details, Mr. Landrigan's grandfather died during a
robbery when he was fired upon by police officers, and he was also
known to be violent man, just as were his son and grandson. 287 Mr.
Landrigan was unacquainted with his biological relatives, having been
adopted as an infant "by an attentive mother and a respectable
geologist . . . ."2 8 8 His adoptive family was described as "straight-laced
"289

Given

Mr.

Landrigan's

upbringing

and

childhood

experiences, the role of any environmental causes was seemingly
diminished. 290
Yet, an undeniably and unsettlingly clear resemblance appeared in
the behavioral patterns of son, father, and grandfather in the Landrigan
case. 291 This led commentators to opine that Mr. Landrigan was
"destined" to commit crimes and to wonder at the possibility that Mr.
Landrigan had inherited his criminal tendencies from his father's
bloodline. 292 In some respects, Mr. Landrigan himself endorsed this
perception in challenging his death sentence; he claimed that his trial
court counsel should have explored a "biological component" to his
violent behavior and should have used those findings to show
mitigating circumstances. 293 Having found the appeal to be without
merit, the Court noted that Mr. Landrigan repeatedly refused to permit
Id. at 471.
See Erin Fuchs, The Cold-Blooded MurdererCouldHelpProveThere's
a "Killer Gene ", BuSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 4, 2014, 5:42 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/adrian-raines-take-on-jelfrey-landrigan-2013-6.
285 See id. (citing ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE (2013)).
286 See Id.
287 See Id.
288 See Fuchs, supra note 284.
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290 See id.
283

284

291
292
293

See id.

Id.
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 471.

38

counsel to present mitigating evidence and that Mr. Landrigan's
courtroom demeanor would have undermined a mitigation defense
anyway, undercutting his claim of prejudice after the fact. 294
Yet, the notion that Mr. Landrigan's behavior was the product of
some "biological component" is clearly at odds with the impressions
of the trial court judge who noted the following:
Mr. Landrigan appears to be somewhat of an exceptional human being. It
appears thatMr. Landriganis aperson whohas no scruples and no regard
for human life and human beings and the right to live and enjoy life to the
best oftheir ability, whatever their chosen lifestyle might be. Mr. Landrigan
appears to be an amoral person.295
The judge's description of Mr. Landrigan belies an assumption that
Mr. Landrigan's conduct and then-expressed demeanor was
symptomatic of a character defect-a lack of morality-which in turn
implied both that Mr. Landrigan could have developed an acceptable
moral center and that his actions were the product of his failure or
unwillingness to develop such a trait. 296
The Landrigan judge's use of the phrase "amoral person" is
distinguishable from descriptions like "person lacking in moral
capacity" or "person whose action's lack morality." 297 The former
phrase, which was employed by the judge, ascribed Mr. Landrigan's
apparent lack of morality to Mr. Landrigan's personhood rather than to
some circumstance particular to Mr. Landrigan's biological or physical
condition. 298 Whether the result of imprecise wording, or the result of
an intentional condemnation, the judge's description simply did not
comport with a potential genetic mitigation defense for Mr.
Landrigan. 299
Mr. Landrigan's case presents a prime of example of how
behavioral genetics can become an issue during criminal
proceedings. 300 By all accounts, Mr. Landrigan's outward courtroom
demeanor and history of violent conduct reflected a morally deficient
person, who chose to engage in wrongful acts. 30 1 Yet, Mr. Landrigan,
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
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at least after sentencing, wished to have the trial court consider his
biology and familial connections as mitigating factors. 302 Had Mr.
Landrigan put on a mitigation defense, there is a possibility that the
trial court might have found that his conduct was at least partially the
result of a genetic predisposition and declined to punish Mr. Landrigan
as severely as it did or, perhaps, not at all. 303
Another anecdotal case involves an unidentified man who was
sentenced to rehabilitation for pedophilia and who was eventually
treated for a brain tumor that appeared to have been the cause of his
abnormal behaviors. 304 The man had a history of preoccupation with
pornographic materials, which began in his adolescence. 305 However,
as the man grew older and approached his middle years, his interest in
pornography began to focus on children and adolescents. 306 As his
behavior began to take on an abnormal quality, the man reported
soliciting prostitutes for the first time in his life. 307 The man was aware
of the impropriety of his actions and, yet, continued to act on his
impulses. 308 Eventually, the man made sexual advances toward his
pre-pubescent stepdaughter, which led to his conviction of child
molestation.309 Even in rehabilitation, the man's sexual impulses
continued to override his judgment, leading to his solicitation of sexual
conduct with staff and patients at the facility. 310
The unique aspect of this man's story is that he had no personal
history of mental illness, or family history of mental illness; he was
educated, fairly successful, and the onset of his lack of control over his
sexual impulses appeared later in life. 31 1 Eventually, the man sought
medical attention, complaining of symptoms that prompted his health
care provider to order an MRI scan. 3 12 The scan revealed a large tumor
in the right, frontal lobe of the unidentified man's brain. 313 Even
during this examination, the man made sexual advances toward staff
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 471.
See id.
30 See Bums & Swerdlow, supra note 273 at 437.
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members of the medical care provider. 3 14 When the tumor was
removed in December of 2000, the man's aberrant behavior subsided
and he was returned to his family after it was determined that he was
no longer a threat to his stepdaughter. 315
In October 2001, the man began to develop headaches and
resumed secretly collecting pornography. 316 Upon reexamination, his
physicians found that the tumor had re-grown. 317 The tumor was again
removed, and again the man's symptoms improved. 318 As Burns and
Swerdlow note, the timing of the recurrence of the tumor and the
unusual behavior of this individual "further establishes causality"
between the two phenomena. 319 While this case does not involve
genetic causal factors, it does illustrate a situation in which conduct
that is normally viewed as morally objectionable can be caused by
physiological changes within an individual, and especially within that
individual's brain.320
The unidentified man's situation is somewhat easier to reconcile
with our moral beliefs and intuitions, and with the present criminal
legal system's purposes, than is the case in which an individual
"blames" his or her conduct on genetics. There is an observable cause
and effect relationship between the growth of the tumor and the
unidentified man's uncharacteristic behavior. 32 1 We would say that but
for his illness, the man would not have behaved as he did and there
was a satisfactorily proximate relationship between that illness and the
behavior such that we no longer believe the man was exercising his
free will. 322

In essence, we can comfortably blame the tumor, in the case of the
unidentified man, for his odd or abnormal behavior, rather than the
man himself. 3 2 3 However, when genetic causation is at issue, there is
an underlying perception that we are no longer necessarily talking
about an affliction (something which happens to a person), but are
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instead talking about the individual as a whole. 32 4 After all, a bad gene
is only "bad" because it has an adverse effect on -an individual's
normal functioning and health, or so it is generally understood. 325
However, if the resulting behavior is viewed as "normal," we no
longer perceive the condition as an illness or as affliction. 326 Instead,
we view it as a variance, as part of the identity of the individual,
subject to moral blame or praise. 327 As a consequence, if criminal
behavior is viewed as a variance in human conduct, rather than the
product of an illness, the criminal is not viewed as ill or injured, but as
morally deficient and deserving of retribution. 328 If, on the other hand,
the unwanted conduct is viewed as the product of an illness, then it
would likely offend due process and human decency to inflict any
form of retributive punishment. 329 The key difference between the two
scenarios is agency and whether the criminal conduct was the product
of free will or of something other than free will. 3 3 0
The unidentified man acknowledged that he was aware of the
wrongfulness of his actions, but found that he could not control his
impulses or otherwise conform his conduct to what he consciously
accepted as appropriate behavior. 331 One might find that this man had
free will, even if he lacked the physiological ability to exercise or
impose that will on his actions. 332 In the context of behavioral
genetics, the determinist would hold that the conscious choices of the
That is not to say that we should embrace thetendency to conflate genes
with identity, but ratherthat we do so in public discourse and that this perception
will influence the layperson's understanding ofmoralblame and genetic identity. See
324
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transgressor are themselves the product of biological causes, such as
genetics, thus precluding the possibility of free will within the
libertarian meaning of the concept. 333 The unidentified man's story is
easier to reconcile with our commonsense understanding of human
behavior and free will, than is the story of someone like Mr.
Landrigan. 334 Whatever else may be true of the unidentified man's
story, however, we are left to ask: Where should we draw the line in
acknowledging a biological cause to human behavior? 335
B. Genetic Causation & CriminalAdjudication
Biological causation and criminology are no strangers to one
another. 336 As Bernet et al. notes, "[e]arly attempts to explain
criminality on the basis of inherited genetic predisposition focused on
phenotype rather than genotype." 337 Bernet et al. describes efforts, in
the late nineteenth century, to establish predictors for criminal
behaviors based on physical characteristics, such "strong jaws, heavy
brows, bloodshot eyes, thick lips, and projecting ears" and later efforts,
in the mid-twentieth century, to correlate body types with
criminality. 338 However, these early efforts to find correlations
resulted in negligible associations between biometric features and
criminal behavior that were insufficient to serve as valid or useful
indicators. 339 However, as the sciences have progressed and as better
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diagnostic tools have been made available to researchers, the level of
sophistication and usefulness of the results of such studies have also
increased and will likely increase further with future developments. 340
Eventually, genetic studies from the mid to late 1960's found their
way into courtrooms with the infamous XYY, or "supermale,"
behavioral genetics studies. 34 1 The first such study, conducted in 1965,
demonstrated the occurrence of an abnormally high distribution of
individuals with XYY chromosomes among violent, institutionalized
criminal offenders. 342 The study examined the karyotypes of 197 male
inmates residing at a Scottish mental health institute, each of whom
had exhibited dangerous and violent criminal behaviors. 343 The study
found that eight inmates bore an additional chromosome, seven of
whom had chromosomes described as having an XYY arrangement.344
These individuals exhibited developmental challenges, as well as an
above-average stature. 345 The study hypothesized that the extra Ychromosome had contributed to the antisocial behaviors or below
average intellect that had led to the institutionalization of these seven
individuals.

346

The conclusion that XYY males are more aggressive and violent
than their normal XY counter-parts became highly controversial; the
finding was heavily critiqued in many commentaries and, now, it is
generally thought of as incorrect. 3 4 7 Nevertheless, the claim that an
340 See generally id. at 1363 ("New advances in behavioral sciences may
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extra Y-chromosome can predispose an individual to commit violent
acts, and that such individuals should not be found responsible for
those acts, was used in several criminal defenses. 348 However, each
time, the defense failed as courts resisted placing exculpation squarely
on a genetic anomaly without more convincing proof of a causal
connection. 349
In State v. Roberts, for instance, the Washington Court of Appeals
refused to find error when a trial court disallowed the defense
additional time to procure evidence of the defendant's alleged XYY
chromosomal status. 350 The Roberts court noted that "'presently
available medical evidence is unable to establish a reasonably certain
causal connection between the XYY defect and criminal conduct."'

35 1

In People v. Yukl, the New York Superior Court made a similar
observation, stating "it appears on the whole that the genetic
imbalance theory of crime causation has not been satisfactorily
established and accepted in either the scientific or legal communities
to warrant its admission in criminal trials . . . ."352 Likewise, in People
v. Tanner, the California Court of Appeals refused to disturb a trial
court's refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea and enter
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 353 The trial court's refusal
was based on the defense's failure to clearly and convincingly
demonstrate a connection between XYY syndrome and the defendant's
criminal conduct. 354
The XYY cases, however, left open the larger question of whether
such evidence would be admissible if the science of behavioral
genetics advanced to the point of establishing causal connections
between specific genetic variations and criminal conduct with more
certainty. The XYY cases notwithstanding, behavioral genetics has the
XYY Controversy: Researching Violence and Genetics, 10 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 1
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potential to alter the outcome of criminal adjudications-especially as
genetics undergoes the aforementioned paradigm shift toward
understanding specific causal mechanisms. 355 As behavioral genetics
progresses, it will become increasingly more difficult for courts to
exclude evidence of genetic predispositions based on the science's
inability to point to specific causal mechanisms to explain the
correlation. 356 It is precisely for this reason that lawmakers and
adjudicators must find a way to cope with issues of free will and
determinism in assessing culpability. 357 Some commentators have
conjectured that this issue will not arise in courts, as phenotypes are
frequently the product of multiple gene interactions and environmental
influences. 358
However, the challenge of reconciling behavioral genetics with
retributivism was brought into sharp relief by the trial of Bradley
Waldroup in Tennessee. 359 In what was described as a "bloody
rampage," Bradley Waldroup "shot his wife's friend Leslie Bradshaw,
eight times, killing her before attempting to kill his wife by chopping
her up with a machete." 360 Leading up to the rampage, Waldroup and
his wife had been experiencing marital distress. 36 1 At the time of the
incident, Waldroup's wife was dropping off their children at
Waldroup's cabin. 362 Waldroup greeted his wife and her friend with a
.22 rifle and demanded that his wife stay to have a discussion. 363
31
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Waldroup then took his wife's keys from her vehicle and threw them
into the woods. 364 After a heated exchange, Waldroup opened fire on
Ms. Bradshaw and then attempted to kill his wife. 365 Reports indicated
that Waldroup had told his children to say goodbye to their mother. 366
The prosecution believed that proving premeditation and deliberation
would be a straightforward issue-that is, until the defense introduced
evidence of Waldroup's genetic pre-disposition to antisocial
behavior. 367

Waldroup was acquitted of the murder/attempted murder charges
(which carried the potential for a death sentence) and found guilty of
manslaughter/attempted second-degree murder instead. 368 At trial, the
court admitted evidence that Waldroup suffered from a genetic
polymorphism resulting in low MAOA production that, when
combined with a history of childhood abuse, led to Waldroup's
explosive reaction. 369 The end game, of course, was demonstrating that
Waldroup's actions were not the product of premeditation and
deliberation. 370 At least one juror came forward after the trial and
admitted that "the science helped persuade her that Waldroup was not
entirely in control of his actions." 37 1 From predisposition to negating
culpability, behavioral genetics was the lynchpin in Waldroup's
successful defense. 372 While it may not yet be common for behavioral
genetics to affect the adjudication phase of trials, it can and does
happen as illustrated by the Waldroup matter. 373
It is worthwhile to note that the free will and actus reus questions
in criminal adjudications are distinctly separate from the issue of mens
rea.374 When analyzing the impact of genetic causation in criminal
364
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prosecution, understanding the difference is crucial For instance, the
Waldroup defense could have argued that the defendant's
predisposition to spontaneous violence was more likely than his
alleged premeditation and deliberation. 375 The mens rea issue is
especially important to the traditional concept of a passion killing-a
homicide committed with such emotional disturbance that courts have
been reluctant to impose the label "murder" and instead branded the
act a species of manslaughter. 376 If Waldroup's actions were the result
of a passionate response, then the requisite mental state may not have
existed and the state could not prove the defendant to be guilty of firstdegree murder. 377 Alternatively, the Waldroup defense could have
argued that the defendant's actions were not the product of his free
will and that the act was, therefore, involuntary. 378
The findings of the Waldroup court, which resulted in the
defendant's convictions of attempted second-degree murder for the
near death of his wife and voluntary manslaughter for the death of
wife's friend, indicate that the court admitted the evidence concerning
low MAOA production to demonstrate that the defendant lacked the
requisite mens rea for a conviction of first-degree murder. 379 The
Waldroup court's decision to convict Mr. Waldroup of manslaughter
rather than murder spared the defendant from exposure to the
imposition of the death penalty. 380 Yet, the comments of at least one of
the jurors indicate that the jury understood the defendant to have
lacked control over his actions-a view that is consistent with a
negation of the defendant's voluntary actus reus.381 The exact impact
of the evidence, on the court's rulings and findings, is therefore
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unclear. 382 This lack of clarity underscores the need for delineating
between the use of behavioral genetics to preclude certain types of
mens rea, the lack of volitional conduct and a general lack of free will
on the part of the offender. 383
Some states have considered the issue of diminished mental
capacity-the inability to form requisite mental states for purposes of
finding that crime has been committed-and found that it should be
narrowed to a question of the more widely accepted insanity defense,
rather than recognizing the argument as raising a separate species of
legal excuse. 384 In State v. Mott, for example, the Arizona Supreme
Court reviewed a trial court's decision to disallow evidence of
Battered Woman's Syndrome on the issue of the defendant's mental
state. 385 The Arizona Supreme Court held that the legal argument, for
which the evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome had been
submitted, amounted to a diminished capacity defense and that
Arizona law does not recognize the defense. 386 Thus, the evidence was
not probative of the issue before the court and was inadmissible for
that purpose. 387 Rather, the trial court was limited to admitting the
evidence solely to extent that it supported a defense of insanity, which
was a recognized legal defense in the jurisdiction. 388 Arizona is
certainly not unique in this approach, and a number of other states
have refused to recognize a separate defense of diminished capacity. 389
At least a few states have permitted evidence of serotonin
deficiency in order to demonstrate the inability to form a specific
mental state. 390 For example, in State v. Payne, an appellate court
approved of a trial court's admission of expert testimony on the
382
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defendant's low brain serotonin level, the role of serotonin levels in
human behavior, and the link between low serotonin and violent and
impulsive tendencies. 39 1 Payne had been charged with several crimes
of violence, including first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree
felony murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. 392 The trial court
had admitted the evidence for three separate purposes, including
rebuttal of the prosecution's evidence on mental state, proof that the
defendant was acting in response to provocation, and as a mitigating
circumstance to reduce punishment. 393 The jury found the defendant
guilty of second-degree murder, a lesser-included offense with a lower
mental state requirement. 394
On appeal, the defense attempted to reverse the trial court's failure
to find adequate provocation to support a reduction to manslaughter,
but the appellate court found that there was no error since provocation
is judged objectively and not subjectively. 3 9 5 While the jury's precise
reasons for returning a verdict of the lesser-included offense of
second-degree murder are unknown, it is likely that the decision was
influenced by evidence of a biological cause or explanation for the
behavior, which supplanted the premeditation and deliberation that
would have led to conviction of first-degree murder.396 It is, of course,
possible that the evidence had a prejudicial effect with the jurorsfalling short of demonstrating diminished capacity but sufficient to
bias the jury against properly weighing the facts and circumstances
that reveal premeditation and deliberation. 397 If so, the jury would
have been acting upon the lay intuition that causation precludes
responsibility for actions. 398
There remains an ancillary issue concerning mens rea and defenses
that attack general intent requirements, as opposed to attacking
specific intent elements. "General intent" refers to "[t]he intent to
perform an act even though the actor does not desire the consequences
that result." 3 9 9 On the other hand, specific intent refers to [t]he intent
to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged
391 See id.
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394 See id.
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with." 400 A majority of states do not recognize diminished capacity
defenses to general intent crimes-the exception being affirmative
defenses based on insanity or mental illness-but some states do
recognize such defenses. 40 1 Additionally, there is another group of
states which allow the admission of evidence on the question of
whether specific intent actually formed in the mind of the accused,
regardless of whether the jurisdiction recognizes the defense that
specific intent generally could not have formed (i.e., diminished
capacity) in the mind of that individual 402
The case of People v. Molina is a prime example of this third
approach. 403 The California Court of Appeals found that the State's
abolition of a defense based on diminished capacity did not preclude a
defense based on negating mens rea or otherwise rebutting the
prosecution's evidentiary showing of the issue. 404 The Molina
defendant "killed her son by stabbing him repeatedly in the heart. She
then inflicted life-threatening wounds to her own chest, set fire to her
house, and resisted efforts to remove her from the house. A garbled
suicide note was found." 405 The trial court denied the defense's request
for a jury instruction allowing for a finding of manslaughter based on
the inability to form the requisite intent for murder. 406 The California
Court of Appeals held that "[a]lthough a defendant is precluded by the
abolition of the diminished capacity defense [in California] . . . from

introducing evidence of mental problems to show a lack of capacity to
form the requisite mental state for the crime charged, such evidence is
admissible to show that the defendant actually lacked such mental
state." 407
Based on the aforementioned series of cases, it is clear that genetic
causation can and does show up in courtrooms in the United States. 408
In the adjudication phase of criminal proceedings, evidence related to
behavioral genetics evidence can be used to support a defense of
400

401
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diminished capacity, or as part of an insanity defense if the jurisdiction
has merged a diminished capacity defense into the question of sanity,
as Arizona did, or to negate the mens rea element of the prosecution's
case-in-chief. 409 For example, as in the Waldroup case, defendants
might argue that the mens rea of intent or purpose may be called into
question when the intent or purpose of that individual is supplanted
with an overriding biological impulse. 410
Additionally, where jurors are used to make determinations as to
mental states and volitional conduct, such evidence has the potential to
influence jurors' folk beliefs about causation and responsibility. 4 11 For
instance, while such evidence may not often appear in the formal
context of demonstrating the non-volitional nature of an act, jurors
may read behavioral genetics evidence as undermining the degree of
control exercised by the defendant in committing the acts constituting
the crime. 412 This is arguably tantamount to jury prejudice, but can
also be viewed as a side effect of using laypersons to make factual
determinations. 413 The same may be said of submitting behavioral
genetics evidence as mitigation evidence during sentencing
proceedings, where jurors are called upon to decide degrees of moral
culpability in light of scientific evidence. 414
C. Genetic Causation & The Imposition of Punishment

In addition to appearing as an issue during criminal adjudications,
behavioral genetics issues may also arise during the sentencing phases
of criminal cases and, in fact, are more likely to appear at this stage. 415
States are not without limitation on their ability to punish and, in cases
where convicted offenders suffer from genetically caused, low MAOA
production or similar anomalies, these limitations may prohibit the
See id.; see generallyCarolA. Gaudet, Linking Genes With Behavior.
The SocialandLegalImplicationofUsing GeneticEvidence in Criminal Trails, 24
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 597, 612 (1997) (noting that criminal defendants may "use
evidence ofa genetic predispositionto violence during the guilt or innocence phase
in two ways: (i) in homicide cases as part ofa 'heat ofpassion' defense to mitigate
from murder to manslaughter, and (ii) in any case to show diminished capacity.").
410 See Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677.
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imposition of certain types of punishment. 4 16 Behavioral genetics
raises at least a few profound questions in the context of criminal
sentencing. 4 17 Is it acceptable to punish individuals whose actions are
at least partially the product of a genetic predisposition of violence and
anti-social conduct? 4 18 If so, should the influence of a genetic
predisposition serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing? 4 19 Is it,
perhaps, better treated as an aggravating factor? 420 This sub-part
explores each of these questions in turn and elaborates upon the role
that behavioral genetics can play in the criminal justice system. 4 2 1
The United States Constitution contains a clause prohibiting the
imposition of "cruel and unusual punishment." 4 2 2 More recently, the
seminal case of Atkins v. Virginia fleshed out the standards of the
applying the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions against cruel and
unusual punishment. 423 Eighteen-year-old Daryl Atkins, and his cofelon William Jones, abducted an airman from a nearby air force
base. 4 2 4 Atkins and his accomplice took money from the victim's
wallet and, having discovered a bankcard in the wallet, compelled the
victim to withdraw funds from an automated teller machine. 425 Atkins
and his accomplice then transported the airman to an isolated
location. 426 Once there, Atkins shot the airman eight times, killing the
man on the spot. 427 The Virginia trial court convicted Atkins of
abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. 4 2 8
At sentencing, the defense called upon a forensic psychologist to
present mitigating evidence. 4 29 The psychologist opined that Aktins

See generallyAdam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness andCriminal
Responsibility: The ConstitutionalBoundariesofCivil Commitment After Kansas v.
Hendricks, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 117 (1999) (discussing these boundaries in the
context of mental illness).
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was "mildly mentally retarded." 430 "His conclusion was based on
interviews with people who knew Atkins, a review of school and court
records, and the administration of a standard intelligence test which
indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59."431 The prosecution, on
the other hand, presented evidence of Atkins' future dangerousness as
an aggravating circumstance, in the form of testimony about four of
Atkins' previous robbery and assault victims, as well as relying on the
'vileness of the offense"' as an additional aggravating factor for
consideration. 4 32 The trial court sided with the prosecution and
sentenced Atkins to death. 433
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the sentence, holding that the Eight Amendment prohibited
the imposition of the death sentence upon mentally retarded
individuals. 434 In arriving at this decision, the Court maintained that
the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in the context of
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 435 The Court further noted that there was a national
consensus reflecting "widespread judgment about the relative
culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship
between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the
death penalty." 436 In part, the Court based its decision upon the view
that imposing a death sentence on mentally retarded individuals does
not advance the objectives of state retributivism or deterrence because
of the offender's diminished culpability and lack of premeditation. 437
The rationale of the Atkins decision could be extended to
individuals who suffer from genetically caused traits that result in low
serotonin production, diminished intelligence, increased aggression,
and/or heightened impulsivity. 4 3 8 The Atkins Court, for instance, noted
that "[t]here is no evidence that . .. [mentally retarded individuals] are
more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others . . . ."439

However, the Court went on to observe that "there is abundant
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evidence that [mentally retarded individuals] often act on impulse
rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan . . . ."440
Similar observations may be made about individuals who have low
MAOA production, which, when combined with a history of
childhood abuse, correlates with violent, aggressive, and impulsive
behaviors. 441 In fact, as Brunner indicated, decreased impulse control
is one of the defining hallmarks of an individual suffering low MAOA
production. 442 As with the mentally retarded, it may be that individuals
who are genetically predisposed to criminal and antisocial conduct
have "deficiencies [that] do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but . . . [which do in fact]

diminish their personal

.

culpability" similar to individuals who are mentally retarded and, thus,
not subject to the death penalty. 4 43
The Supreme Court made similar observations in deciding that the
Eighth Amendment disallows the capital punishment of individuals
who are under the age of majority at the time the crime at issue was
committed. 444 In Roper, the State of Missouri sought to impose the
death penalty on seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons for
burglary and murder.445 Simmons had concocted the plot, which
involved breaking into the victim's home, tying up the victim, and
throwing the victim off of a bridge. 446 Simmons sought the assistance
of two younger accomplices, to whom he assured the trio would "get
away with it" due to their age. 447
Despite the apparent premeditation involved in the case at hand,
the Supreme Court took issue with the imposition of the death
sentence for crimes committed while under the age of majority.448 The
Court noted that the imposition of death under such circumstances is
contrary to evolving national and international "standards of decency
. . ."449 In part, the Court's decision to disallow a death sentence under
such circumstances was based upon the widespread belief children
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have an "underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . ."450 Lacking the
same sense of responsibility as adults, young offenders are thought to
lack the requisite mental maturity to form the most reprehensible
mental states. 451
As in Atkins, the Roper Court indicated that impulsive and
uncalculated behavior is less heinous and, therefore, less culpable than
behavior that is the product of unencumbered and maturely exercised
decision-making processes. 452 It is important to note that the Roper
Court made no distinction among individual minors. 453 In other words,
the Roper Court did not say that certain under-aged offenders were
less culpable by virtue of their immaturity.454 Rather, the Roper Court
generalized about the maturity and mental processes of all children. 455
It may be the case that courts are not interested in whether genetic
predispositions have actually played a role in the behavior of the
particular individual before them.456 Alternatively, it may be that
courts have relied on older population-based studies that have only
been able to demonstrate group correlations, such as in the
aforementioned classic approach to behavioral studies. 457 If it is the
latter, modem studies should begin to alter the way in which jurists
think about the issue.
However, a class of such genetically predisposed individuals may
generally consist of persons who (more often than not) do not form the
requisite culpable state of mind when acting violently or criminally,
even if some of these individuals do actually form the required mental
state. 458 Thus, courts might be more inclined to inquire into whether
genetic predispositions preclude certain types of punishment from the
class as a whole, based on qualities such as lack of impulse control. 459
If so, and if the behavioral genetics evidence progresses to the point of
being generally accepted in the courtroom, there is a chance that
having a certain gene and certain set of life experiences may act as a
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windfall for the defense, regardless of whether these factors played an
actual part in causing the crime. 460
Even if behavioral genetics evidence is found insufficient to
preclude the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, it may
nevertheless serve an important mitigating factor during sentencing
hearings. 461 "Prior juror studies demonstrate that the three most
important factors in death penalty deliberation are (1) the gravity or
'vileness of the crime,' (2) the defendant's 'future dangerousness,' and
(3) the defendant's remorsefulness." 462 A major objective of good
defense counsel, during criminal sentencing hearings, is to humanize
the defendant in the eyes of the jurors in order to elicit sympathy and,
ultimately, mercy. 4 6 3 As Walker explains, "humanizing" the defendant
involves "distanc[ing] him or her from the heinous act." 464 Of course,
what better way is there to distance the accused from an act than by
placing blame for the act on something which is beyond the control of
the defendant-his or her genes? 4 6 5

It is worth noting, however, that there is also the chance that a jury
might view the evidence as indicative of future dangerousness and,
therefore, transform the mitigation evidence into a double-edged
sword. 466 Unless the reduced penalty remains an adequate deterrent, or
otherwise proposes to rehabilitate the offender, the evidence might
actually support a harsher sentence in an effort to neutralize the future
threat posed by the defendant. 467 Walker observes this possibility,
noting that a similar argument has been made with respect to
neuroimaging. 468 This unintended outcome, of course, is in tension
See id.
See generallyBrett Walker, When the Facts and the Law Are Against
You, Argue the Genes?:A PragmaticAnalysisofGenotyping MitigationDefenses
for Psychopathic Defendants in Death Penalty Cases, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1779
(2013).
462 Id. at 1811 (citing John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Scott E.
Sundby, Competent Capital
Representation:The Necessity ofKnowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell
Us About Mitigation,36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2008)).
463 See id.
464 See id. at 1779.
465 See generally id.
466 See Walker, supra note 461, at 1805-06.
467 See id.
468
See id. at 1805 (citing 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the
"Complexity " of CapitalPunishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1271 (2007)). It is
worth noting here that the Landrigan case is an example of such a double-edged
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with the notion that offenders whose crimes were the product of illness
or injury are considered to be less culpable and less deserving of
punishment. 469 The retributivist justification of punishment is
undermined by the use of behavioral genetics in sentencing
proceedings, in addition to adjudication proceedings. 470
The view of reduced personal culpability for individuals suffering
from genetic predispositions can have a very real impact on sentencing
hearings. 47 1 Behavioral genetics studies have already had this type of
an impact in at least one other country's criminal justice system. 4 72 In
2009, an Italian court of appeals reduced a convict's prison sentence
by one full year in light of evidence demonstrating the defendant's
genetic predisposition to low MAOA production. 473 "Abdelmalek
Bayout, an Algerian citizen who has lived in Italy since 1993, admitted
in 2007 to stabbing and killing Walter Felipe Novoa Perez . . . "3474
The dispute leading up to the killing erupted when the victim allegedly
insulted Bayout's religiously worn eye make-up. 4 7 5 Bayout's defense

counsel successfully argued that Bayout's sentence should be
mitigated due to Bayout's psychiatric illness. 476 As a result, Bayout's
sentence was reduced to nine years and two months-approximately
three years less than what he would have otherwise received under
local law. 4 7 7

While Bayout was serving his sentence, defense counsel sought to
have the sentence reduced further by seeking relief in the Court of
sword because the presiding judge viewed Mr. Landrigan's apparent lack of
"morality" very negatively. See Landrigan,859 P.2d at 117.
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Appeal in Trieste. 478 The Italian court ordered new forensic reports,
which revealed abnormalities in Bayout's brain as well as the presence
of five genes/gene variants associated with violent behavior (including
among others the MAOA regulating gene). 4 79 Presented with this new
evidence, the Court of Appeal in Trieste commuted Bayout's sentence
by an additional year. 4 80 Bayout's alleged genetic predisposition to
violence was not an issue relevant to adjudication, but it did play an
important role in the Italian court's view of the Bayout's moral
culpability and in mitigating the punishment administered. 4 8 1 In this
way, behavioral genetics had a very real impact on the sentencing
phase of Bayout's criminal trial 4 82
Behavioral genetics studies have also found their way in American
sentencing hearings. 4 83 In Hill v. Ozmint, for example, a court
permitted testimony of an expert witness 'on the defendant's
"genetically-based serotonin deficiency." 4 8 4 In Hill, the defendant shot
a police officer during an otherwise routine traffic stop. 4 8 5 The
defendant attempted to evade authorities by ditching his vehicle and
claiming that it was stolen at the time of the shooting, as well as
washing his hands with a bleach product prior to submitting himself to
the police. 4 8 6 At trial, however, the defendant claimed that he was
involuntarily in the vehicle at the time of murder and that the officer
was actually shot by another passenger, to whom the defendant owed a
large sum of money from a failed drug transaction. 487 The defendant
was found guilty of murder. 4 88
At sentencing, the defense called upon three expert witnesses who
testified "Hill suffered from a treatable neuro-chemical disorder." 489
Specifically, the expert testimony indicated that the defendant suffered
from a serotonin deficiency, resulting in aggressive behavior.490
See id.
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480 See
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Despite this mitigating evidence, the jury recommended a sentence of
death. 491 While the exact reason for the jury's decision is unknown, it
could have been that the mitigation defense was- hampered by the
unprofessional behavior of the defense's expert witness, who suffered
a breakdown while on the stand.492 In any event, the court did allow
the defense to submit evidence on the defendant's genetic
predisposition to aggressive behavior at sentencing in an effort to
mitigate the defendant's sentence. 493 As Walker opines, states
following the Daubert or Frye standards for the admission of scientific
evidence would most likely allow evidence in support of mitigation
defenses based on genotyping. 494 The Ozmint decision, together with
many of the aforementioned cases, supports this view.495
Despite studies demonstrating an apparently low rate of success for
mitigation defenses based on genotyping in past cases, there remain
open questions as to whether such studies truly reflect the possibility
of success of such defenses and whether ongoing advancements in the
scientific fields have changed the game. 4 9 6 For instance, Denno
reviewed two samples of cases totaling eighty-one (81) criminal
matters to determine the impact of behavioral genetics evidence in
criminal cases. 497 Using a sample of thirty-three (33) recent cases,
Denno noted that from 2007 to 2011, "behavioral genetics evidence
has appeared to have been applied almost exclusively as mitigating
evidence in death penalty cases and primarily in two ways to support
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for neglecting such
evidence or to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant's mitigating
condition." 498
Walker aptly indicates that Denno's results do not forecast the
likelihood of success for genotyping mitigation defenses, because such
defenses are often raised for the first time after conviction and
sentencing, and in the context of collateral review for ineffective
assistance of counsel 499 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in
cases where the defendant is eligible to receive a sentence of death,
491
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commonly revolve around mitigation evidence because of the
heightened constitutional requirements that trial counsel explore and
present all mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings.500
This may encourage attorneys to explore behavioral genetics solely in
the mitigation context, after the verdict of guilt, or it may cause trial
counsel to overlook the importance of using such evidence during the
adjudication phase of a criminal proceeding, which is a risky
proposition if effective assistance of counsel requires competent
counsel to consider or explore the possibility of such a defense. 50 1
Walker also notes that in Denno's other study, which included a
sample of forty-eight (48) cases spanning a longer and earlier thirteen
(13) year period, only one case involved genotyping, whereas the
remaining cases involved reviews of family history or exploration of
substance abuse/mental health problems. 502 Denno observes that when
assessing the results of the more recent set of cases (in contrast to the
older set of cases), "substantially more cases . . . incorporated

behavioral genetics evidence of any kind . . . ."503 These findings
indicate a trend towards permitting behavioral genetics evidence for
mitigation purposes, during sentencing hearings. In any event, it is not
entirely clear that Denno's results have any bearing on the likelihood
of success in using genotyping defenses based on modern studies, such
as defenses concerned with the MAOA or SLC6A4 genes. 504
It is also worthwhile to note that, in some instances, American
courts might properly find that submitting evidence of a genetic
predisposition is not only permitted but essential to the effective
assistance of defense counsel during a sentencing hearing. 505 In the
Von Dohlen case, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed a lower court's sentence based on defense counsel's failure to
adequately prepare and present mitigating evidence during the penalty
phase of the trial. 506 The evidence, if presented, would have purported
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revealed to the trial court that the defendant suffered from a
genetically-linked mental illness at the time of the murder. 5 0 7
The Von Dohlen defendant's actions appeared to be the product of
"cold premeditation." 508 He had robbed a dry cleaning shop and killed
a female clerk using his shotgun. 509 The defendant alleged that leading
up to the incident, the clerk had refused the defendant his change and
told the defendant that his brother, who had recently passed away,
deserved to die. 510 The defendant then walked back to the pawnshop
where he worked as a manager and returned with a shotgun.511 The
defendant alleged that he then forced the victim to disrobe, in order to
create the illusion that the incident was related to a rape, and then he
robbed the establishment to make the incident also appear to be a
robbery. 5 12 At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and armed
robbery. 5 13
At trial, the defense's expert witness testified that defendant
suffered from a minor, temporary mental disorder stemming from the
defendant's loss of his brother, coupled with pathological
intoxication. 5 14 The prosecution undermined the expert's testimony
and, in closing, argued that the defendant "did not suffer from any
mental or emotional disturbance . . . ."s5s The prosecution argued that
"His brother . . . dying, a less than perfect childhood, vagaries, ups and
downs of life that we all suffer . . . . These are things every person

goes through . . .. He could provide not one bit of excuse." 5 16 The jury
apparently sided with the prosecution. 517 The defendant was sentenced
to death and twenty-five years in prison for murder and armed
robbery. 518
In his application for post-conviction relief, the defendant claimed
that defense counsel had been ineffective in preparing the defense's
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expert witness. 5 1 9 The expert witness testified that had he reviewed the
additional records, which were available to counsel at the time of the
sentencing, he would have been able to testify as to the defendant's
genetically caused chronic, depression. 52 0 According to another expert
witness's testimony at the post-conviction relief hearing, the condition
rendered the defendant's homicidal acts something other than the
product of the defendant's free will: "[the murder] was not a volitional
thing but out of his conscious awareness or control." 52 1 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina found that counsel's failure to
prepare the defendant's expert to testify on a major mental illness was
ineffective assistance of counsel. 522 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed Von Dohlen's sentence and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. 523 On remand, the trial court imposed a life
sentence with the possibility of parole after thirty years, but did not
impose a death penalty. 5 2 4

III.

RESIDUAL ISSUEs: ADDRES SING OBJECTIONS AND
SOME PRACTICAL CONCERNS

Having explored the problem of free will and the implications of
using behavioral genetics in the criminal law, it is now necessary to
address the naysayers who argue that no such problem exists, or that if
it does exists, practical considerations will diminish the likelihood that
the problem will impact the institution of criminal justice. 5 25 This part
is bifurcated. 52 6 The first sub-part addresses philosophical objections
to the proposition that behavioral science undermines the criminal
law's presumption of free will 5 2 7 The second sub-part will address
in
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A. Concerning PhilosophicalIssues

A number of authors have argued that there is no free will problem
implicated by using behavioral science evidence in the courtroom and
that, even if such a problem exists, it is of no moment to the criminal
justice system. 5 2 9 Morse, for instance, has engaged this topic with
considerable force, having published at least five articles related to the
intersection of science, free will, and the criminal law. 5 3 0 In Morse's
view, the law presumes that persons have a general capacity for
conscious, practical reasoning and that a person acts on beliefs, with
the intent of satisfying personal desires. 531 This presumption is
necessary, Morse maintains, in order to make sense of the legal
system's efforts to influence human behavior through incentives and
disincentiveS. 532 If, the argument proposes, the law can have no effect
upon the actions of persons, the law becomes a senseless and useless
thing, at least as applied to such individuals. 5 3 3
Morse's position, which Nadelhoffer and Nahmias have correctly
identified as a reductio ad absurdum argument, draws its strength as
any redectio ad absurdum argument does: on the presumption that the
contrary position is absurd or untenable. 534 For Morse's argument to
carry real persuasive force, Morse would have to demonstrate that if
we accept the proposition that there is no free will absurd results
necessarily follow such that existence of free will is the only logical
conclusion. 535 Morse's argument is undermined both by centuries of
debate among philosophers about the existence of free will and by the
&
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opinions of modem day laypersons/jurors who seem readily willing to
accept the implications and consequences of a view of genetic
determinism that precludes moral responsibility. 53 6
Furthermore, the allegedly absurd consequence noted by Morse is
essentially that the current incarnation of the American legal system
would become untenable. 53 7 Yet, this consequence is hardly absurd. 538
It is no great task to imagine a legal system based wholly on utilitarian
ideals or, for that matter, a system that does rely on moral
responsibility to justify itself. 539 To the extent that such a system is
tenable, or even likely, Morse's reduction ad absurdum argument
cannot carry the day. 540
Morse also argues that a legal system presumes its ability to
influence persons, but he appears to assume that if a person's actions
are not governed by free will the law cannot affect that person's
conduct. 54 1 He uses this proposition to leverage the conclusion that we
must therefore assume the existence of free will if we are to have a
working system of laws. 54 2 Morse is mistaken. 54 3 A law may affect an
individual even if that individual's exercise of will is just an illusion
and even if that individual's knowledge of the law leads to only one
possible future outcome for the actor. 544
The mere perception of free will acts to influence the actor, and it
may be that as a prescriptive matter, all persons should assume the
existence of their own agency, but it does not follow from these
premises that free will exists in an objective sense or that the law must
presume the existence of free will 54 5 After all, in a utilitarian system,
it is the result the matters and not the justification. 5 4 6 The correctness
of Morse's argument requires a complete rejection of the possibility
that the legal system, as it currently exists, is flawed from the ground
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up and in need of an overhaul. 547 This proposition requires its
proponents to assume too much. 548
Morse has another major argument on the issue of whether
behavioral science evidence threatens free will, but at its core the
argument essentially denies the persuasive value of some scientific
claims, based on the current state of the sciences. 549 Nadelhoffer and
Nahmias observe the following of Morse's argument:
On the one hand, neuroscience could establish that all human thoughts and
actions are caused deterministically by antecedent neural events and
processes . . . . According to neuro-determinism, while human agency

ultimately supervenes on (i.e., is composed of and depends on)
deterministic neural events andprocesses, the folkpsychologicalframework
identified by Morse nevertheless has an explanatory and etiological role to
play .

. .

. On the other hand, neuroscience could establish that the

traditional folk psychological picture of human agency is erroneous ....
Accordingto this purely reductionistic and mechanistic view, it's not only
that human thoughtand actionsupervenes onneural processes; it's also that
neuroscience shows that folk psychological categories are causally and
explanatorily irrelevant."5 o
Nadelhoffer and Nahmias explain that the result of this latter claim is
that "we could fully explain human agency in terms of neural events
and processes such that neuroscience would explain away human
agency-.e. in some important sense, human agency would be an
illusion . . . " forcing us to "radically rethink the traditional picture of

agency and responsibility." 551 Morse argues that the sciences present
only indirect evidence of this conclusion, and that the evidence does
not support a conclusion that causal mechanisms bypass conscious
will. 552
Morse, unfortunately, has discounted the fact that the science is
apparently convincing to at least some laypersons who serve as jurors,
and the probability that the science is likely to improve with time. 553
Furthermore, Morse apparently assumes the existence free will,
probably because the law assumes a traditional understanding of free
547
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550 Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, supra note 534.
551 Id.
552 See id. 164-65.
553 See Barber, supranote359 (reporting ajuror's comments in response to
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will, and argues that indirect demonstrations under the present state of
scientific evidence are insufficient to overcome this assumption. 554
Certainly, the commonly accepted view assumes the existence of some
type of free will. 55 5 However, in practice, legal advocates carry the

burden of proof on any assertion they wish to advance and, as the
evidence against free will mounts, the existence of free will cannot be
taken for granted. Furthermore, tradition is hardly a persuasive reason
to ignore an increasingly common conclusion supported, albeit
indirectly, by a variety of scientific fields. 5 56 Indirect scientific
evidence brings the discussion into the land of probability, and
probability often depends on examining the totality of relevant data
and a weighing of the evidence.557 Morse may be correct in indicating
that the findings of neuroscience are meager when weighed against our
folk intuitions about free will, but Morse's implication is far weaker
when considered in light of the findings of neuroscience, genetics,
psychology, physics, and other similarly situated sciences, which point
toward the seemingly inescapable conclusion that all things (including
consciousness and human action) are caused and predetermined, in the
aggregate. 558
In any event, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias offer an excellent account
of why, in the face of scientific advances, the free will problem may
pose a legal and policy problem to the institution of criminal justice
despite Morse's claim that there is no normative problem.

559

"[If

people are systematically confused about the relationship between free
will, neuroscience, and the law, then this is not merely an interesting
sociological fact about folk intuitions; it is a potential legal and policy
problem . . . ."560 As Nadelhoffer and Nahmias explain, this is a

descriptive problem, rather than a normative problem.561 In other
words, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias do not take a firm position on
whether or not judges and jurists should be concerned with the
554
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problem of free will. 562 Rather, Nadelhoffer and Nahmias opine that
judges and jurists are concerned with the problem of free will and that
this in itself is a problem worth exploring and addressing. 563 Thus,
regardless of the correctness of Morse's position, a free will problem
persists in courtrooms and needs to be reconciled. 564
Hollander-Blumoff explores a closely related issue in terms of the
psychology of self-control, placing an emphasis on the view that
courts will inquire into self-control rather than into the more abstract
question of free will. 565 However, even if the law accepts the apparent
exercise of self-control on specific occasions as a substitute for the
more abstract notion of subjective free will, then there develops a
tension between the law's treatment of certain classes of individuals
(i.e., juvenile and mentally retarded offenders) and specific individuals
who may belong to class not yet officially recognized as deserving of
leniency (i.e., individuals with low MAOA production). 566 In any
event, Hollander-Blumoff argues that while the law presumes free
will, 'true' free will" is irrelevant to the exercise of self-control. 567
Supporting her position, Hollander-Blumoff notes that individuals
differ in the degree by which they can control their own actions,
thereby demonstrating that control and free will are not necessarily
linked. 568
Hollander-Blumoff's position, however, conflates two distinct
claims often made by behavioral determinists. 569 As Morse noted of
the neurosciences and to use Nadelhoffer and Nahmias' terminology, a
determinist can either maintain (1) that the "folk psychological
framework," intervenes on biological causes or (2) that the biological
causes can bypass this framework rendering human consciousness
meaningless. 570 Hollander-Blumoff's argument assumes the first
claim, without fully addressing whether our conscious minds are
themselves caused by predetermined biological factors, thereby
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'

rendering our folk notions of choice nothing more than an illusion. 57
If the later claim is true, then there is no such thing as self-control and
the distinction is wholly irrelevant. 572 In a way, Hollander-Blumoff
assumes the correctness of Morse's position and presents the same
rhetorical weaknesses. 573
B. ConcerningPracticalIssues

The overarching concern of this writing, thus far, has been to
illustrate how the use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal
proceedings creates a philosophical disconnect between the purposes
of the criminal justice system and the manner in which that system
operates. 574 The use of such evidence in criminal proceedings,
however, also gives rise to a number of practical issues that should at
least be acknowledged, if only briefly.5 75 The remainder of this part is

dedicated to exploring such practical issueS.576 Such issues include the
inherent difficulty of having judges, who often lack adequate scientific
training, apply evidentiary standards to novel forms of scientific
evidence and the challenge of finding adequate resources to permit an
already burdened system to explore the mysteries of human
behavior. 77

The proposition, that criminality can be reduced to a web of
genetic and environmental causes, is inherently rife with the difficulty
of defining criminal behavior.57 8 Criminality is a legal construct. 579
Crimes are crimes because of a legal definition; debated upon by a
legislature, enforced by officials, and interpreted by courts.58 0 The
elements of crimes do not necessarily always reflect or track biological
phenomenon, nor do they necessarily attempt to approximate human
instinct or social mores. 581 To be sure, conventional wisdom might be
571
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expressed in the law, but as any first year law student knows, the law
does not always reflect basic human intuitions. 582 As a result of this
disconnect, "some researchers have argued that criminal behaviours
should be examined within the wider context of antisocial
behaviour." 583
Sometimes antisocial behaviors overlap with criminal behaviors,
but not all criminal behavior is anti-social and not all anti-social
behavior is criminal 584 As a result, much of the scientific research,
which involves looking at anti-social behaviors, may be extremely
narrow in its applications in the criminal law.5 85 For instance, the

research may only be relevant to violent crimes or crimes with high
scienter requirements, such as first-degree murder, and completely
irrelevant to other classes of crimes, such tax evasion or criminal
trespass. 586 Thus, the research may be admissible in legal proceedings
for limited classes of crimes. 58 7 In this respect, some might argue that

the controversy over genotyping defenses and behavioral genetics
evidence is a tempest in a teapot-affecting very few cases in
practice. 588
However, dismissing the free will problem because it affects only
few cases (and thus is of marginal concern) ignores the current
underpinnings of the criminal justice system because the resulting
framework would be resemble a utilitarian model rather than a mixedjustification model 589 Such a position does not comport with our
traditional intuitions about the criminal justice system and, in any
event, is much like concluding that it would be acceptable to execute
only a few mentally disabled individuals if the system as whole
otherwise functions properly. 590 Obviously, in a system where
retribution and just desserts are a central concern, policy is not made
this way and, arguably, such policies would be immoral. 591 If we find
582
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that imposing punishment without due consideration of the genetic
predispositions of the offender is morally wrong or unconstitutional,
then the frequency of the situation is ultimately irrelevant to this
discussion. 592
The issue of frequency, however, may be relevant to other practical
questions, such as whether permitting genotyping defenses would
exacerbate the already heavy burdens of the criminal justice system
and, in light of such burdens, whether the result justifies those
increases. 593 If genotyping for behavior becomes a mainstay of
criminal defense attorneys, then effective assistance of counsel may
require that the state pay for such tests and for expert witnesses to
render opinions on the results. 594 Such an outcome could result in an
undue financial burden on the limited public funding available to
criminal defendants. 59 5 On this point, Walker notes that "the use of
these types of evidence does not exhibit much of an upward financial
departure from average mitigation costs [in capital sentencing
proceedings]." 596
However, Walker's observations were limited to costs for using
such evidence in favor of mitigation during sentencing hearings. 597
When these costs are added to the costs of using the same or similar
evidence during the adjudication phases of criminal proceedings, and
placed in the context of the high pre-existing costs of criminal
defenses, there is significant cause for concern about the financial
burden imposed on society. 598 To this point, Walker indicates that the
costs of a genotyping defense may be high and notes that the average
cost of a typical mitigation defense in capital cases is already
approximately $50,000.00.599 Thus, the frequency of these cases may
become relevant to our practical concerns, since if such a defense were

there is a biological deficiency, while punishing others of whose biological
deficiencies we are ignorant would be immoral).
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regarded as a right in large classes of cases, the costs would be
compounded. 600
Another practical issue is the high possibility of jury confusion and
the attendant burden on judges to serve as gatekeepers to the
admissibility of such forms of evidence. 601 Genotyping defenses,
simply put, are complicated. 602 The science of genetics and its related
fields is rapidly evolving. 603 The exact import of the findings of
behavioral genetics is not always fully understood or settled upon by
experts. 604 This, of course, greatly heightens the risk of jury confusion
beyond the levels normally associated with expert testimony and
scientific evidence. 605 It is unsurprising, then, that some jurors (despite
receiving admissible expert testimony) nevertheless reduce complex
explanations of human behavior to simplistic, folk-intuitive notions
about the free will of human beings. 606 After all, if the experts do not
fully understand the science, laypersons are at least equally unlikely to
understand it. 607

More importantly, as is often the case with scientific evidence,
there is a glaring disconnect between the methodology of behavioral
genetics research and the methodology of courts as "truth-finding"
institutions. 608 Science is often concerned with validating hypotheses
through observable phenomenon before the fact, whereas courts are
concerned with establishing definitive, relevant findings (the truth,
"with a capital t" to use a colloquial phrase) after the fact. 609 The
600
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sciences are forward-looking and predictive, whereas adjudications are
backward-looking and in search of a specific level of certainty. 610 The
divide between the methodologies of behavioral genetics and legal
practice is no different in this regard. 61 ' Reasonable scientific certainty
is a different standard than preponderance of the evidence or
reasonable doubt. 612
In this regard, every time new and cutting-edge science is put
before a court, courts are asked to compare apples and oranges in
deciding whether and how much to rely on such forms of evidence. 613
Worse yet, when scientific evidence is put before a court, judges are
for all practical purposes forced to become experts in both science and
philosophy, and made to wrestle with impossible inquiries into the
meaning and admissibility of scientific evidence that undermines the
very way in which we traditionally define the human experience. 6 14 Of
course, legal tests and standards, like Daubert and its predecessor,
Frye, guide the questions to be asked by judges. 615 However, the
question of relevance hinges on the metaphysical leanings of the
gatekeeper-the judge. 6 16
Such scenarios invite judges to impose their personal philosophical
views on the nature of human existence, using the guise of
commonsense or judicial discretion (both of which are wellestablished roles for the judiciary) to justify the imposition. 617 Of
course, while "each judge comes to the bench with a unique
background and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply
the law without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves
of the law in question." 618 The question then becomes whether we
wish to relegate admissibility to the "personal philosophy" of
See id.
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612 See generally David H. Kaye, Proof in Law and Science, 32
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judges? 619 This question becomes inevitable when the application of
the law depends on a metaphysical question. The answer should be a
resounding "no" when that personal philosophy embraces foundational
inquiry into the human experience and, arguably, religious concerns
therewith.
In essence, such scenarios might call upon judges to make subtle
decisions on the metaphysical dilemma of free will-a task well
beyond purview of courtroom. 620 The solution, then, appears to be
disentangling the legal from the philosophical, which as discussed
above requires revisions to the architecture of the criminal justice
system. 621 Thus, for both philosophical and practical reasons, if we are
to continue to permit genotyping and human behavior defenses, the
structure of the criminal justice system itself must be revisited to
create harmony between theory and practice. 622 Below, Part IV
explores some of the different potential approaches available to
facilitate this reconciliation.623
IV. COPING WITH THE PImosOPicAL DILEMMA OF

FREE WILL

While the problem of free will may pose a theoretical impasse for
the American criminal justice system, and contrary to the position of
Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, at least some commentators disagree that
there is a descriptive problem posed by the rise of genotyping
defenses. 624 Such commentators, in essence, believe that the justice
system is unlikely to undergo any massive changes due to

619 See generally State JusticelnstituteA Judge'sDeskbook on the Basic
available at
Philosophies and Methods of Science (1999),

http://www.unr.edu/justicestudies/About/JudgesDeskbook.pdf(last visited Sep. 1,
2014) (noting, in Chapter 3, that the object is to have the reader articulate a personal
philosophy of science and to be aware of how this philosophy might influence
decision-making). In the case ofgenotyping evidence,judges should also be taught
to become aware oftheirpersonal philosophy ofmetaphysic and the influence that
philosophy might have decision-making.
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developments in behavioral genetics and the use of genotyping
defenses in courtrooms. 625
[I1f people are born with much greater tendencies than others to be involved
in particular activity, they do not seem to have the requisite ability to
control forces within them that can be triggered when commingled with
environmental stimuli. Of course, a legal systemthatpresupposes free will
is unlikely to give much weight to these findings.6 2 6

Others have argued that genotyping defenses will have a limited
impact on legal proceedings. 627 Paul Appelbaum, chair of the
American Psychiatric Association's Council on Psychiatry and Law,
for example, has commented that such evidence is likely to appear as
mitigating evidence during sentencing but not as exculpatory
evidence. 628 Yet, there have been at least some cases (and there will
most likely be more)' in which courts have admitted behavioral
genetics evidence and simply let juries-typically comprised of
laypersons-decide the impact this evidence will have on the guilt of
the accused and consequently the appropriate range of penalties that
might be imposed. 629 In such scenarios, behavioral genetics has the
power to confound the legal system's understanding of free will and
criminal culpability. 630
Regardless of the normative concerns presented, as the
admissibility of such scientific evidence becomes more and more
likely, courts and legislatures will be confronted with these issues,
whether through careful self-reflection, academic commentary, or
media criticism.631 This part explores different approaches to
reconciling the law's understanding of free will with the emerging
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impact of behavioral genetics. 632 This part considers three possible
solutions to the problem, including: (1) simply excluding such
evidence from criminal proceedings; (2) adopting a compatibilist-style
approach to the problem of free will; and (3) setting aside the
retributivist theory of punishment in favor of a more harmonious
objective. 6 3 3
A. Excluding Evidence of Genetic Predisposition

.

In most circumstances, courts could simply refuse to admit
evidence of a genetic predisposition to aggression, during the guilt
determination phases and/or sentencing phases of criminal
prosecutions. 634 At least one commentator has anticipated this
reaction. 635 Appelbaum notes that "courts are going to be asking for a
link that [lawyers] will have difficulty establishing since choice always
seems possible, and the behavior is not completely determined . .
."636 However, this presumes that the science will not advance to a
stage at which experts will be able to supply the necessary "link" of
precluding choice. 637 It also presumes that individual judges and jurors
will stick with the traditional folk psychological view of human
agency-two propositions that are doubtful in light of the cases and
studies noted above, in Part 11.638
In any event, some uses of behavioral genetics evidence are more
likely than others to result in the admission of behavioral genetics
evidence during criminal proceedings. 639 For instance, evidence that is
directly related to either an insanity defense, or a defense that is based
on negating specific intent, may have sufficient resonance with judges
to survive objections to relevance, while evidence that is aimed at
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negating general intent is unlikely to survive such objections. 640 Also,
courts may tend to only admit such evidence during sentencing phases
when it is absolutely required by the United States Constitution-in
other words, only when capital punishment is a potential outcomebut refuse do so in other instances. 64 1
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments place restrictions on the
method by which juries consider mitigating evidence during capital
sentencing hearings. 642 These restrictions broaden the admissibility of
mitigating evidence during certain phases of capital sentencing
proceedings. 643

"

It is in regard to the eligibility phase that we have stressed the need for
channeling and limiting the jury's discretionto ensure that the deathpenalty
is a proportionate punishment andthereforenot arbitrary or capricious in its
imposition. In contrast, in the selection phase, we have emphasized the need
for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an
individualized determination. 6
However, when the sentencing hearing does not expose the defendant
to the possibility of a death sentence, then there is no constitutional
requirement that a court admit any and all potentially mitigating
evidence. 64 5 Thus, during criminal adjudications and in a vast majority
of sentencing hearings, courts could exclude evidence related to
genotyping defenses. 646
For example, in Mobley v. State, defense counsel sought expert and
financial assistance to have the defendant checked for genetic
mutations associated with an MAOA deficiency. 64 7 The defense in
Mobley intended to submit the results, if positive, as mitigating
evidence during the sentencing phase of the proceedings. 648 The trial
court refused the requests of the defense based on the insufficiency of
See generally JULIAN R HANLEY & WAYNE W. SCHMIDT, LEGAL
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scientific evidence regarding the correlation between geneticallylinked MAOA deficiency and violent aggression. 649 The defendant
then sought relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel based on the unorthodox nature of the mitigation defense, but
the Georgia Supreme Court held that it was a "reasonable strategic
decision." 650
The Mobley case illustrates that while courts cannot employ a
wholesale ban on behavioral genetics evidence, courts need not
necessarily admit behavioral genetics evidence if that evidence fails to
meet the necessary standards for admission of scientific evidence and
relevance. 65 1 While evidentiary rules might work to exclude some uses
of behavioral genetics evidence, it will not always exclude such uses
and, in any event, will not always result in the same outcome from
courtroom to courtroom. 6 5 2 Additionally, relying on the standards for

admissibility raises those concerns discussed in Part III, above, related
to permitting judges to make decisions based on personal,
metaphysical views. 653 For these reasons, relying on courts to exclude
behavioral genetics evidence will result in a patchwork of outcomes
and fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the open question of
whether such evidence squares with the stated, traditional goal of
retribution.
B. Adopting Compatibalism in the American Legal System
As some commentators have suggested, the American criminal
justice system could rely on a compatibilist approach to the free will
problem, thereby allowing for the admission of evidence of behavioral
causation but redefining free will in a manner that is consistent with
determinism. 654 As Greene and Cohen indicate, the problem of free
will has formed three schools of thought on the problem of free will:
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hard determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. 655 The hard
determinists simply accept that all things are caused and abandon the
concept of free will altogether. 656 The libertarians, in contrast, reject
the idea that all things are caused and maintain that absolute free will
exists. 6 5 7 Down the middle of this divide, the compatibalists accept the
determinist view of causation, but nevertheless claim that free will
exists, albeit in a form that is arguably less meaningful than that
articulated by the libertarians. 658 Similarly, legislatures and courts can
accept that free will in the legal context means something other than
absolute, unencumbered decision-making that originates from some
internal, uncaused source of human will. 6 5 9
Another, similar, solution is to substitute subjective inquiries into
free will with objective inquiries. 660 Greene and Cohen contend that
the law is not really concerned with the issue of free will at all and that
the law is really only concerned with whether the defendant has a
minimalistic capacity for "rational choice." 661 This position differs
from that of Morse in that it does not take a stance on the objective
existence of free will, whereas Morse maintains that the folk intuitive
notion of free will must exist and that the same is not undermined by
the findings and conclusion of the behavioral sciences. 662
Greene and Cohen do not actually come out and say it, but their
position seems to be that the law does not inquire into subjective issues
of free will and is concerned merely with an objective assessment. 663
This characterization of the law is untenable in light of the manner in
which American courts regularly make inquiries into matters related to
free will. 6 6 4 The very fact that some courts, such as in the
aforementioned Landrigan matter, concern themselves with subjective
free will questions undermines Greene and Cohen's contention insofar
as it is a descriptive claim. 665 Admittedly, however, Greene and
655
656
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Cohen's position could be taken as a normative assessment and, in this
sense, might overlap significantly with Morse's viewpoint. 666
In adopting an objective approach, the law would no longer ask
about whether the defendant actually exercised free will (an obviously
metaphysical question) and, instead, ask about whether it appears that
the defendant was exercising free wilL 667 The law can, and frequently
does, adopt legal fictions to accomplish specific results. 6 6 8 This
approach would de-emphasize any need to identify actual mechanisms
of causation, and allow triers of fact to consider causal influences
without the absolutes of the metaphysical problem of free will. 669 In
sum, courts would be able to maintain a retributivist justification for
criminal punishment, to maintain a basis for criminal responsibility
generally, and still accept the perception that human behavior is
actually genetically/environmentally caused. 670
However, this approach leaves much to be desired. 671 Shifting to
an objective inquiry would only legitimize what is otherwise a
counterintuitive outcome; that our genes and experiences can serve as
mitigating or excusing evidence suggests an arbitrary application of
the criminal law. 6 72 After all, why should the law tolerate repugnant
conduct merely because the actor had the misfortune of being born
predisposed to such conduct but otherwise elected to engage in such
behavior? 673 There is an inherent deference between being born with a
666
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mental illness and being born with a poor temper-commonsense tells
us that the former should not be punished while the later should be
emphatically punished. 674 Replacing our common understanding of
free will, with a legal fiction, might sidestep the metaphysical
problem, but it does not solve the practical problem of squaring our
social understanding of culpability with a legal system that considers
such seemingly remote causal influences. 675
Morse hints at a quasi-compatibilist approach when he argues that
determinism is not inconsistent with folk psycho-legal conception of
personhood, in which the law has presumed a capacity for rational
action. 676 Morse writes, "the truth of determinism does not mean that
actions are indistinguishable from non-actions or that mental states do
not exist .

. .

. these facts are also true and make a perfectly rational

legal difference according to theories of responsibility and punishment
we embrace . . . .s677 In Cssence, Morse presupposes either that the law
has either already rejected the libertarian view of free will in favor of a
so-called psycho-legal definition of free will or that the criminal law's
pre-existing structure necessitates the assumption. 678
Morse's contention, that the current structure of the American legal
system necessitates a psycho-legal conception of personhood, does not
account for the alternative possibility of reconciling determinism with
the law by shifting the law's objectives. 679 As discussed above, one
solution might involve restructuring the criminal justice system to
focus on utilitarian values or, perhaps, moving toward a mental health
model of criminal justice as discussed above. 680 Whatever the case
may be, maintaining that the system's structure necessitates a legal
fiction does not mean we have to accept that legal fiction wholesale,
especially when changing the system is itself a possibility. 68 1
Another possibility is to supplant our traditional notion of absolute
free will, in which either an individual has acted freely or not freely,
Contra Morse, The Non-Problem, supra note 10; Nadelhoffer
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677 Morse, The Non-Problem, supra note
10, at 2552.
678 See generally id.
679 See generally id.
680 See supra Parts IV(A) & V(A)-(B).
681 See id.

81

with a sliding scale model. 6 8 2 Denno presents this alternative
viewpoint as "degree determinism" in which "varying degrees of free
will and determinism exist in all actions depending ... on such factors
as biological and environmental forces." 683 According to Denno,
degree determinism resolves the problem of the predictive weakness of
the then-present state of the sciences or, in other words, the inability of
the sciences to predict human behavior with absolute accuracy. 684
Denno's position is rather persuasive. 685
The problem of free will originates in part from the libertarian
assumption that free will is unfettered and uncaused. 686 However,
science tells us that if free will exists, it must exist as one force among
many in the causal chain leading to a decision or action.687 As such, a
decision or action may never be fully caused or fully absent some
causal influence, and may run the gamut of every degree in
between. 688 If we assume, as a retributivist system requires, that the
causal chain of an action has some irreducible x-factor that science
will never fully dissect, identify, or predict, and we place that x-factor
on a causal chain, then we can assess criminal culpability in terms of
the behavior's proximate relationship to free will. 689 Thus, we can
reconcile predictive behavioral sciences with the retributivist ideals of
the current criminal justice system. 690
However, as Denno indicates, this solution presumes that the
behavioral sciences have a fictitious account of causation. 691 Denno
writes:
The apparent conflicts concerning philosophies of behavior may in reality
be conflicts regarding notions of causality. "Cause" in the criminal has
become a bankrupt term .... "Cause" in the social sciences is an illusion. A
more acceptable social science approach is to predict behavior in terms of a
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series of probabilities that certain events will result in an expected
outcome. 692

In this vein, Denno appears to have sided with Morse on the position
that the behavioral sciences cannot support a view of hard
determinism. 693 Denno and Morse also appear to agree on the
proposition that the behavioral sciences do not entail the conclusion
that human decision-making does not exist (Le., a view that the future
cannot be other than what it is regardless of our perception that we can
alter it). 694
Unlike Morse, however, Denno's position is not rooted in a
nuanced definition of free will. 695 Rather, Denno's position appears to
be based instead in lack of predictive value of the behavioral
sciences. 696 In other words, while Morse argues descriptively that the
behavioral sciences do not support the hard deterministic outlook of
causal mechanisms, Denno argues normatively that the sciences
should not be viewed to support such a position. 697 The arguments
presented against Morse in Part III(A) above apply here and there is
little need to revisit the same challenges. Denno's position adds little
more to the debate on this point, and is substantially susceptible to
many of the same arguments as those made against Morse's position
above. 698
C. Walking Away From the RetributivistTheory
Commentators and policymakers could simply abandon the
retributivist theory of criminal law. After all, courts have no business
answering political questions, let alone metaphysical and existential
questions, and if retributivism necessitates an answer to such questions
692
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it should be eliminated from our legal system. 69 9 At its core, the
controversy of free will begs us to answer profound philosophical
dilemmas regarding the meaning of "human being" and the meaning of
"existence." 700 Some commentators disagree, claiming there is no
normative problem, but as the forgoing analysis has concluded, the
argument is not yet decided and continues to pose a problem for the
justice system.701 Embracing retributivism necessarily entails a
number of metaphysical and existential positions; it is simply not the
role of courts to address those issues.
To see how the free will problem exposes deeply metaphysical and
existential questions, one need only consider the debates that rage on
amongst transhumanist scholars, who argue about whether technohuman transcendence heralds the extinction of the human race. 702
Posthumanist criticism questions the universal state of human nature
as posited by traditional humanism. 703 Posthumanist philosophy
charges that "humans" have an emergent ontology, rather than existent
ontology, capable of changing their perspective and reconstituting
their identity using that perspective. 704 In contrast, traditional
humanism views human beings as emerging from the universal state of
humanity. 705 Consequently, within the posthumanist framework,
human beings can transform themselves, both physically and
psychologically, into something other than what we traditionally
regard as "human beings." 706
Under the posthumanist paradigm, transhumanist scholars
advocate provoking such a change through the use of technology,
often citing inevitability and utility as justifications for the
transformation. 707 The philosophical roots of the transhumanist debate
are expressed by our search for the cause of human behavior. 708 If
699 See generallyLegal Information Institute, Political Question Doctrine,
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1,
University
Law
Cornell
http://www.law.comell.edu/wex/political-questiondoctrine.

See generally supra Part I(B).
701 See supra Part III(A).
702
See DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS,
70

REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991).
703

See id.

7

See id.

701

706
707
7os

See id.
See id.

See HARAWAY, supra note 702.
See id.

84

CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE

"human" is a universal quality, then it contains by definition certain
human behaviors. 709 If, however, "human" is merely a way of
describing a living, breathing group of organisms with no independent
meaning, then there is no such thing as "normal human behavior." 710
Rather, there is only the behavior that does occur, as opposed to
behavior that should occur. 711 If the latter is true, or if courts are to
take no position on this philosophical question, we are forced to
rethink or abandon our understanding malum in se criminal conduct
and, with it, retributivism. 712
If, in redefining these concepts, we find that they are to be given
purely legal constructions, then we are simply accepting that criminal
law is a tool of regulation and organization-retribution would no
longer be a necessary or viable justification for punishment. 713 As
Gray indicates, we could approach the criminal law system with a
view that all crimes are malum prohibitum, leaving the problem of evil
to philosophers and theologians. 714 The criminal law does not need
retributive justice in order to operate, and associated notions such as
free will and just desserts would have no place our legal system.7 1 5
In essence, American law would and could simply abandon the
concept of retributive justice and accept that the criminal jurisprudence
should be concerned with utility rather than with blame. 716 This is less
of an outrageous suggestion than it seems at first. 71 7 The law, while

traditionally expressive of community morals, does not have to always
advance social notions of fairness and justice. 718 Greene and Cohen,
for example, argue that the law will, and should, shift from traditional
709
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theories of retributivist justice to utilitarian justifications. 719 However,
other commentators have noted that no penal system can be
completely justified on the basis of less than all of the aforementioned
justifications. 720 This particular view of criminal law and punishment,
however, underestimates the possibility of a revolution in criminal
law, in which the entire system is reinvented to fit our understanding
of society, the natural world, and the aims of our leadership. 721
For example, crime could transform into a public health concern,
rather than a regulatory concern. 7 2 2 There is nothing immediately
novel about the idea of treating criminal behavior as symptomatic of
mental illness. 72 3 Some professionals have predicted that in light of
advancements in genetic research, "[t]he treatment of 'criminals' . .
[will become viewed as] a medical issue, and the ethical issues, [will
become viewed as] issues of medical ethics."

72 4

Criminal punishment,

under such a scheme could become preventative, focusing on methods
to change the physiology and/or psychology of the criminal offender
through medical treatment.725 Thus, commentators, like BrooksCrozier, propose novel approaches to crime, such as early intervention
for families with children suffering from low MAOA production, in
hopes of reducing the incidence of violent crimes. 7 2 6

.

The dystopian flavor of such a shift is undeniable. Parker and Hope
predict that "the link between socially unacceptable behaviour and
reproductive responsibility will become increasingly the focus of
social policy, media pressure and medical intervention." 727 They
conclude that "for those who have a genetic disposition to such
behaviour and who cannot afford enhancement or modification
treatments, it will become socially unacceptable to have children
719
720
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which in turn they believe will lead to systematic discrimination.7 28
The mere possibility of such outcomes has been sufficient to stunt the
development of behavioral science research in genetic causation and,
likely, could prevent the American legal system from embracing such
a shift at any time in the near future. 729 This, however, is a descriptive
challenge and does not shed light on whether such a shift is truly in the
best interests of society-fear should not dictate policy.730
Each of the two overarching justifications of punishment,
retributivism and utilitarianism, serves to counterbalance the other. 731
A purely utilitarian approach would occasionally result in absurd
outcomes, justifying even the most counterintuitive result, such as
sacrificing one hardly culpable individual for the sake of the
community at large or inflicting disproportional punishment to
accomplish general deterrence goals. 732 If purely utilitarian
justifications were employed, it would be difficult to maintain a
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 733 In fact,
sentencing would be turned on its head as fact finders would be called
upon to judge punishment absent an internalized sense of justice and
based only on the speculative social outcomes. 734 However, this
possibility ignores the "safety valves" built into a legal system. 7 3 5
Utility would be a goal, not a requirement, and commonsense cannot
be fully eliminated from the process. This does not, however, mean
that commonsense needs to be a goal (i.e., the retributivist
justification) of criminal punishment.
Admittedly, retributive justice is deeply entrenched in the instincts
and moral judgments of ordinary citizens. 736 For many, a purely
utilitarian approach might be virtually indistinguishable from our
system of tort laws, wherein relief is aimed at making whole that
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which has been made un-whole and at deterring future harm. 737 A
reduction of the criminal law to a tort system would be dissatisfying;
after all, it was designed to fill a gap between criminal and civil law,
rather than to swallow up the system as a whole. 73 8 In fact, many
would find dissatisfaction in a system which does not accept that bad
acts are in themselves worthy of punishment and which does not give
weight to the idea that those who are aggrieved may have the balm of
vengeance applied to their injuries. 73 9
A penal system which does not recognize retributive justice would
fail to express social judgments regarding moral and immoral conduct
and, in this way, would suffer a disconnect from lay intuitions about
justice. 740 It is important to recall that the criminal law came long
before tort law-it is old and powerful in the minds of many
individuals. 74 1 The sanctioned punishment of wrongdoers offers a
catharsis that assuages social unrest. 7 4 2 Absent such satisfaction,
widespread vigilantism and mob justice might well find itself in
resurgence after having been quelled in modem times. 743 To abandon
retributive justice is to abandon the average person's need for redress
and to rebuff a communal desire for balance. 744
This last objection is perhaps the most difficult challenge to
overcome because it calls into question the use of human emotion and
experience to guide criminal justice. 745 It is perhaps the one
proposition that has allowed retributivism to persist for millennia after
millennia and across many different civilizations. 746 To this, there is
little to say other than that intuitions must sometimes give way to the
conclusions of observation and careful reflection. 747 Intuition is a
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powerful tool, but it is not a lens by which all human action should be
governed. 748 It must be given its proper place in policy making and
accorded the weight it deserves in light of the advancements of science
and technology. 749 Only time will tell.
CONCLUSION

Genotyping defenses are not much different from certain other
types of defense strategies, which have been commonly accepted for
decades.750 Denno's research, for instance, lumped cases dealing with
genetic predispositions to violence together with cases dealing with
genetic predispositions to alcoholism and mental illness. 7 5 1 Arguably,

while the methods of the science may be different, genotyping
evidence is substantially similar to older forms of behavioral genetics
evidence, including modern neuroscience evidence, in that each type
of evidence raises similar legal defense goals and philosophical
implications. 752 In each instance, the objective is to identify biological
causes of human behavior and to use those causes as a tool for
assessing responsibility.753
If so, it may be that any solution aimed to resolving the
philosophical inconsistencies between genotyping defenses and the
criminal justice system will miss the mark. Yet, genotyping defenses
threaten to reduce human behavior to specific causal mechanisms in a
novel way. 7 54 This specificity of the research makes causation
arguments more palpable and enhances the likelihood that such
evidence will be found admissible in adjudication proceedings. 755
Thus, genotyping defenses are more likely to persuade courts and
Hodgkins on et al., Intuition:A FundamentalBridgingConstructin the Behavioural
Sciences, 99 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 1 (2008).
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jurors that defendants are not responsible for their acts than would
earlier forms of behavioral genetics evidence, which, at best, indicate
some unidentifiable mixture of biological influences.7 5 6
However, because the free will problem has persisted for a long
time in the criminal justice system, any solution to the specific
problem caused by genotyping defenses should also account for other
areas where the problem may arise. 757 For this reason, a solution that
proposes to remove retributivism from the justice system would be
superior to a solution that merely precludes the admissibility of
evidence to support genotyping defenses. 75 8 Alternatively, the justice
system should redefine "free will" in a manner that permits a
deterministic
account of human behavior, often argued by
philosophers who espouse compatibilism, but this solution also
remains wanting in some respects. 7 59 Whatever the solution may be, it
needs to address the bigger picture and not simply aim to preclude a
narrow class of evidence. 760
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